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The Terms of the Trust: Extrinsic Evidence
of Settlor Intent
By Fred Franke and Anna Katherine Moody*
Each edition of the Restatement of Trusts defined the phrase “the terms of
the trust” exactly the same. It means the manifestation of the settlor’s intent expressed in a manner that admits of its proof in judicial proceedings.
This definition weds the language of the instrument to the evidentiary
rules governing Trust contests. This article explores the extent to which
extrinsic evidence of settlor intent is admissible and consequently a consideration for those puzzling out the meaning of a trust.
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INTRODUCTION
The meaning – or ambiguity – of certain words or phrases
may only become evident when placed in context.
– Sandra Day O’Connor1
Questions about the meaning of a trust arise in a variety of ways.
Perhaps a trustee is puzzling out how to apply the written text of the
trust to an unexpected or novel circumstance. In other cases, beneficiaries may question their interest in the trust or, as is sometimes the
case, whether the trustee is acting properly.
Answers to these questions depend on the terms of the trust. The
terms of the trust embody the settlor’s intent: “The phrase ‘terms of the
trust’ means the manifestation of the intention of the settlor with respect
to the trust provisions expressed in a manner that admits of its proof in
judicial proceedings.”2 Accordingly, it is not the language alone, but the
language of the trust in its contextual circumstance, that comprises the
terms of the trust:
The phrase “the terms of the trust” is used in a broad
sense in this Restatement, as in many statutes and cases. It
includes any manifestations of the settlor’s intention at the
time of the creation of the trust, whether expressed by written
or spoken words or by conduct, to the extent the intention as
expressed in the manner that permits proof of the manifestation of intent in judicial proceedings. The terms of the trust
may appear clearly from written or spoken words, or they may
be provided by statute, supplied by rules of construction, or
determined by interpretation of the words or conduct of the
settlor in the light of all of the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the trust.
Among the circumstances that may be of importance in
determining the terms of the trust, either in the absence of a
1 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (O’Connor,
J.). The case turned on whether nicotine is a “drug” and thereby susceptible to regulation by the federal Food and Drug Administration. The court held that it was not a drug
within the context of either the statute granting the FDA regulatory authority over drugs,
or other federal statutes unrelated to the FDA regulatory authority.
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 (2003) (emphasis added). Each Restatement of Trusts uses this definition. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4
(1959); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 4 (1935).
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written instrument declaring those terms or in matters about
which a written instrument is silent or ambiguous, are the following: (1) the situations of the settlor, the beneficiaries, and
the trustee, including such factors as age, legal and practical
competence, personal and financial circumstances, and the relationships of these persons and these factors to each other; (2)
the value and character of the trust property; (3) the purposes
for which the trust is created; (4) relevant business and financial practices at the time; (5) the circumstances under which
the trust is to be administered; (6) the formality or informality,
the skill or lack of skill, and the care or lack of care with which
any instrument containing the manifestation in question was
drawn.3
Whether, and to what degree, extrinsic evidence may be used to
determine settlor intent will depend on the evidentiary rules and other
rules of construction in each jurisdiction. In the absence of statutory
provisions, common law provides the basis for these evidentiary rules.4
Additionally, the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) addresses some of these
issues, so jurisdictions adopting a version of it will have modified their
common law to a certain degree.
Under the common law generally, there are three potential barriers
to the introduction of extrinsic evidence – the plain meaning rule (including its twin, the parol evidence rule), the dead man’s statute, and the
hearsay rule.
I. THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean – neither
more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make
words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be
master – that’s all.”5
3

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. a.
Nevertheless, state-by-state distinctions exist. See infra Appendix.
5 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 124 (London, MacMillan &
Co. 1872).
4
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* * *
The ordinary standard, or ‘plain meaning,’ is simply the meaning of
the people who did not write the document.
The fallacy consists in assuming that there is or ever can be some
one real or absolute meaning. In truth there can be only some person’s
meaning; and that person, whose meaning the law is seeking, is the
writer of the document.6
A. The Plain Meaning Rule in General
The plain meaning rule excludes evidence of settlor intent when
interpreting a will or testamentary trust. Instead, the interpretation
must rely on the “plain meaning” of the words in the document:
[The plain meaning] rule, which hereafter we will call the ‘noextrinsic-evidence-rule,’ prescribes that courts not receive evidence about the testator’s intent ‘apart from, in addition to, or
in opposition to the legal effect of the language which is used
by him in the will itself.’7
An early Massachusetts case, Mahoney v. Grainger,8 illustrates this
prohibition. In Mahoney, the decedent told her lawyer that she wanted
to leave the residue of her estate to her first cousins to share equally.
She characterized these first cousins as her nearest relatives. The residuary clause was thereupon drafted to provide the residue to the decedent’s heirs-at-law living at her death.9 Her cousins, however, were not
her heirs-at-law under Massachusetts law because she was survived by a
maternal aunt:
A will duly executed and allowed by the court must under
the statute of wills be accepted as the final expression of the
intent of the person executing it. The fact that it was not in
conformity with the instructions given to the draftsman who
prepared it or that he made a mistake does not authorize a
court to reform or alter it or remold it by amendments. The
will must be construed as it came from the hands of the testatrix. . . .When the instrument has been proved and allowed as a
will oral testimony as to the meaning and purpose of a testator
in using language must be rigidly excluded.10
6

9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2462 (1981).
John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the
Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 521
(1982) (citing 4 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, § 20.1, at 158 (1978)).
8 Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86 (Mass. 1933).
9 Id. at 86.
10 Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
7
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The plain meaning rule is not merely a relic from the past in some
jurisdictions. In a modern Maryland case, for example, the court refused to consider extrinsic evidence from the scrivener (and from a legatee who would testify against his pecuniary interest) that the phrase
“personal property” was meant by the testator to only include tangible
personal property and was not meant to include corporate stocks, bonds
and bank accounts.11 The court held that the phrase “personal property” has a plain, established meaning and that extrinsic evidence could
not be introduced to contradict that meaning. The Maryland court’s ruling rendered meaningless a “pour-over” provision in the will directing
the residue to an inter vivos trust.12
Because the plain meaning rule often excludes consideration of evidence of the testator’s intent, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills
and Other Donative Transfers distinguishes between a testator’s actual
intent and his attributed intent:
The donor’s intention is sometimes referred to in this Restatement as the donor’s actual intention, in order to contrast it with
the intention that is attributed to the donor by an applicable
constructional preference or rule of construction.13
The plain meaning rule requires that a testator’s donative intent be
found strictly from the language used in a will regardless of the certainty
derived from extrinsic evidence that such language misstates the testator’s actual intent. Generally testamentary trusts, but not inter vivos
trusts, follow the plain meaning rule governing wills.14
Why evidence of actual intent must be precluded is murky. Modern
justifications of the rule include (1) a fear of evidence fabrication, (2)
the possibility of fraud, (3) a concern that a decedent had relied on the
language used, and (4) that such extrinsic evidence is unattested and
therefore violates the will statutes.15
11

See Emmert v. Hearn, 522 A.2d 377, 382 (Md. 1987).
Id.
13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.2 cmt. a (2003).
14 Id. § 12.1 cmt. c (“The reformation doctrine for donative documents other than
wills is well established. Equity has long recognized that deeds of gifts, inter vivos trusts,
life-insurance contracts, and other donative documents can be reformed [using extrinsic
evidence] . . . .”); Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 312 A.2d 546,
555-56 (Md. 1973) (“[T]he doctrine of (trust) reformation is ordinarily applicable only in
cases . . . involving inter vivos trust instruments. Here we are confronted with a testamentary trust and . . . the general prohibition against reformation of a will would prevail.”).
15 Andrea W. Cornelison, Dead Man Talking: Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 811, 815-817 (2001).
12
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1. The Plain Meaning Contrasted with the Parol Evidence Rule
The plain meaning rule applicable for testamentary instruments is
similar, but not identical, to the parol evidence rule. Although most
often considered a rule of contract law, the parol evidence rule applies
to trusts:
If a deed of real or personal property, or a trust agreement
involving a transfer of property to the trustee, or a declaration
of trusts, purports to contain a complete statement as to the
existence and terms of a trust, the parties will not be allowed to
vary or contradict the instrument by the introduction of oral
evidence. This is the parol evidence rule which applies to the
creation of trusts, as well as to many other transactions.16
The parol evidence rule is not as stringent as the plain meaning rule: it
only blocks the admission of evidence if the instrument was “adopted by
the settlor as the complete expression of the settlor’s intention.”17 Once
reduced to a writing embodying the complete expression of such settlor
intent, there is no need for any other evidence of such intent; all earlier
expressions of intent have become integrated into the final document.
This parallels the parol evidence rule of contract law which applies the
doctrine only to “integrated agreements” and which provides that extrinsic evidence may not be used to contradict or vary the terms of an
instrument in the absence of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake or
other grounds which permit reformation or recession.18
The parol evidence rule differs in purpose and consequence from
the plain meaning rule:
It is often stated as a rule applicable to the law of wills that
evidence of statements of intention made by the testator is not
admissible in the process of determining the meaning to be
given to his will. [The plain meaning rule] – although its continued application under modern conditions of trial is not altogether approved by Thayer – is regarded by him as a rule of
evidence rather than of substantive law. His supporting illustrations are taken from the cases dealing with wills rather than
16 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 51 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2014) (footnote omitted);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 21 (2003). Although most of the cases applying the parol evidence rule involve inter vivos trusts, the rule applies to testamentary
trusts as well. See, e.g., Pickelner v. Adler, 229 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. 2007).
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 21 cmt. a.
18 See id. § 21 Reporter’s Notes cmt. a. (“‘[The parol evidence rule] is not a rule of
evidence but a rule of substantive law . . . . It renders inoperative prior written agreements as well as prior oral agreements.’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 cmt. a.).
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contracts. Whether the old notions of policy behind this rule
are sound or not, the rule is not part of, or an application of,
the “parol evidence rule.”. . . The “parol evidence rule” does
not exclude proof of [statements of intent] on the issue of the
meaning and interpretation of the words.19
Therefore, in theory, parol evidence will be excluded to alter the
terms of a written agreement yet be admitted to explain the meaning of
its terms if otherwise ambiguous.20

19 Arthur Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 625 (1944). Professor
Corbin argues in this article that the parol evidence rule is, in fact, a rule of substantive
law and not a rule of evidence. Id. at 604-05 n.2. Thus, it does not preclude evidence of
intent to prove the meaning of ambiguous language in the written contract. Id. Parol
evidence, however, may not be used to alter the terms of a written contract if that contract was intended to be the complete expression of its terms. See Collar v. Mills, 125
P.2d 197, 201 (Okla. 1942). The plaintiffs in Collar v. Mills, in an effort to continue the
property in trust, alleged that they were additional beneficiaries after the death of the
named life beneficiaries: “[I]f we determine that plaintiffs are correct when they allege,
that this property was left to defendant in trust we are immediately met with the wellknown rule of law that if the beneficiaries of the trust are designated parol evidence is
inadmissible to contradict or vary the designation.” Id. at 199-201.
20 Finding the line between what constitutes altering a trust, on the one hand, and
explaining the meaning of its terms, on the other, can be a challenge. Compare Langbein
& Waggoner, supra note 7, at 568 (“Hence,‘[t]he parol evidence rule of itself is never an
obstacle to reformation, provided there is satisfactory evidence of a mistake in integration.’”) (quoting George Palmer, Reformation and the Parol Evidence Rule, 65 MICH. L.
REV. 833, 833 (1967)), with Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and
the Parol Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 801 (2002) (“‘The logic of this dichotomy is unassailable, so is its impracticality. The very same words offered as an additional
term that are rejected because the court deems the writing to be a total integration, can
be offered as an aid to interpretation of an ambiguous written term. Able courts look at
both proffers of evidence as governed by the ‘parol evidence rule.’ Thus, the parol evidence rule and the plain meaning rule [as applied to contracts] are conjoined like Siamese twins. Even though many academics and more than a few judges have tried to
separate them, the bulk of the legal profession views them as permanently intertwined.”)
(footnote omitted).
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2. The Statute of Frauds as an Additional Bar to Extrinsic
Evidence
Most states have adopted a version of the statute of frauds, which
would require that a trust of real property be in writing.21 Some states
have extended this requirement to govern trusts of personal property.22
A properly signed memorandum . . . is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of a statute of frauds if, but only if, it indicates
that a trust is intended and, together with the circumstances,
provides a reasonable basis for identifying the trust property
and the beneficiaries and purposes of the trust. . . .
A writing may sufficiently identify these elements of the
trust even though it requires resort to interpretation or leaves
some reversionary beneficial interest(s) to be supplied by operation of law.23
The purpose of the statute of frauds is to protect those with legal title to
property from challenges based on extrinsic evidence. Nothing precludes the trustee of an oral trust falling within the statute from administering the trust in accordance with its terms:
The Statute of Frauds is intended to protect holders of legal title to lands against whom trust claims are made and who
deny the existence of any trust or of the trust as described by
the plaintiff. Strangers to the trust, therefore, cannot in any
way attack the oral trust on the ground of the lack of a written
statement of it. Although, collaterally, it might be of advantage to these third parties to have the oral trust declared unenforceable and the trustee an absolute owner, they will not be
allowed to bring about that result. The trustee may refuse to
rely on the Statute and may go on with his performance of the
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 22 cmt. a. Many states enacted statutes
based on section seven of an English statute enacted 1677 which provided “that ‘all declarations or creations of trusts or confidences of any lands shall be manifested and proved
by some writing, signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or by his
last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect.”’ Id. Other states
have similar provisions based on other sections of the English statute and some states
have no statute of frauds for trusts. Id.
22 BOGERT, supra note 16, § 65 (“In Georgia all express trusts must be created or
declared in writing, and hence oral trusts of personalty are unenforceable, and this is true
also in Indiana, Louisiana and Oregon.”) (footnote omitted). The Uniform Trust Code
does not intend to alter existing statutes of frauds. Unif. Trust Code § 407 cmt. (2010)
(“Absent some specific statutory provision, such as a provision requiring that transfers of
real property be in writing, a trust need not be evidenced by a writing. States with statutes of frauds or other provisions requiring that the creation of certain trusts be evidenced by a writing may wish to cite such provisions.”).
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 22 cmt. f. (2003) (citation omitted).
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oral trust, or he or his successors in the ownership of the alleged trust property may plead the Statute of Frauds.24
As with the statute of frauds generally, a trust beneficiary may enforce
the trust based on part performance.25 The part performance doctrine is
extrinsic evidence of the “missing” terms of an oral trust: “the evidentiary function of the statutory formalities is fulfilled by the conduct of
the parties.”26
B. Common Law Exceptions or “Workarounds” to the Plain
Meaning Rule
The plain meaning rule is not, however, absolute. At common law,
there are at least two formal exceptions involving will or testamentary
trust interpretation that permit extrinsic evidence – (1) the latent ambiguity exception,27 and (2) evidence of the facts and circumstances of the
testator’s situation at the time of the execution of the will creating the
trust.28 Additionally, there are cases permitting extrinsic evidence to
rebut the presumption that a document that complies with all the testamentary formality rules does not necessarily mean that the decedent
had read and understood the will, thus permitting the document to be
set aside.29 Finally, there are evidentiary cases involving charitable be24 BOGERT, supra note 16, § 70 (footnote omitted). A trustee in bankruptcy, however, can assert the statute of frauds. See 11 U.S.C. § 558 (2013) (“The estate shall have
the benefit of any defense available to the debtor as against any entity other than the
estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and any other personal
defenses.”).
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 24 cmt. c. Comment c of the Reporter’s
Notes on Section 24 states:
This comment is consistent with Restatement Second, Trusts § 50 (entitled “Part
Performance”), the black letter of which states: “Although a trust of an interest
in land is orally declared and no memorandum is signed, the trust is enforceable
if, with the consent of the trustee, the beneficiary as such enters into possession
of the land or makes valuable improvements thereon or irrevocably changes his
position in reliance upon the trust.”
The doctrine of part performance, even as applied to trusts, is broader than
the above statement indicates. In general, see Restatement Second, Contracts
§ 129, stating: “A contract for the transfer of an interest in land may be specifically enforced notwithstanding failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds if it
is established that the party seeking enforcement, in reasonable reliance on the
contract and on the continuing assent of the party against whom enforcement is
sought, has so changed his position that injustice can be avoided only by specific
enforcement.“
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 24 Reporter’s Notes cmt. c.
26 Id.
27 See Part I.B.1, infra.
28 See Part I.B.2, infra.
29 See Part I.B.3, infra.
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quests that would foretell a more modern, permissive approach to the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence.30 The plain meaning rule has been
characterized as an historic relic with limited, recognized utility:
Because of a growing distrust and dissatisfaction with the
application of hidebound interpretive rules to testamentary
documents, the law of will interpretation has gradually evolved
from a stiff and often artificial formalism to an almost organic
approach to interpretation that extols the quest for the testator’s intention. Courts today, seeking to temper technical rigidity, contemplate a reduced role for the application of rules
of construction in the wills context, with the trend toward admitting extrinsic evidence to cure a multiplicity of ills in wills.
In the course of this evolution, the use of will interpretation
manuals has fallen from favor and the rules governing the admission of extrinsic evidence have been increasingly relaxed
and refined.31
1. The Latent Ambiguity Exception
In some jurisdictions, the exception permitting extrinsic evidence to
clarify an ambiguity turns on whether the ambiguity is latent or patent.
A latent ambiguity is one where the terms of the will appear clear and
without ambiguity, but those terms yield more than one meaning once
the extrinsic evidence is permitted.32 An example of the latent ambiguity would be a bequest “‘to my cousin John,’ . . . if evidence extrinsic to
the document reveals that the testator had no cousin named John when
he executed the will but did then have a nephew named John and a
cousin named James.”33 A patent ambiguity, on the other hand, is one
arising from an apparent contradiction within the document itself or
where a term that is used in the document could yield several meanings.34 A patent ambiguity would be a bequest of “my money,” raising
the question as to whether the phrase was intended to apply only to the
decedent’s cash on hand or, more generally, to the decedent’s assets.35
As a general rule, latent ambiguities permit extrinsic evidence, whereas
patent ambiguities do not.
30

See Part I.B.4, infra.
Richard F. Storrow, Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction Between
Will Interpretation and Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 66 (2005) (footnotes
omitted).
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§11.1 cmt. c. (2003).
33 Id.
34 See id. cmt. b.
35 See id.
31
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The “leading American decision”36 establishing the availability of
extrinsic evidence to remedy an ambiguity is Patch v. White.37 In that
case, the testator’s will referred to property bequeathed to his brother
that the testator “did not, and never did, own.”38 The language of the
will, however, was not ambiguous in its description of the wrong property. It took extrinsic evidence to demonstrate that the decedent did not
own the property identified in the will but, instead, owned other property that he had meant to leave to his brother.39 The Court found, “[i]t
is settled doctrine that, as a latent ambiguity is only disclosed by extrinsic evidence, it may be removed by extrinsic evidence.”40
A latent ambiguity, however, only exists where the extrinsic evidence is necessary to show the ambiguity. The Restatement (Third) of
Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers illustrates this distinction
by expanding on its illustration of a will leaving a bequest “to my cousin
John.” If, in fact, the testator had a cousin John but actually meant to
leave the bequest to his cousin James and the scrivener would testify
that it was a scrivener’s error that inserted “John” for “James,” a latent
ambiguity would not exist.41 A latent ambiguity would only exist if
there were never a cousin John to begin with, or the testator had two
cousins named John.
When the Maryland court found in Emmert v. Hearn that “personal
property” means both tangible and intangible personal property,
thereby negating the pour-over residuary clause, it applied the latent
ambiguity test by looking at the phrase separately and not in the
broader context of whether such an interpretation may make other provisions irrelevant.42 It applied the latent ambiguity test in its pure form
and found no such ambiguity:
That a latent ambiguity does not exist in the provisions of
Roberts’ will is equally clear. Such an ambiguity occurs when
“the language of the will is plain and single, yet is found to
apply equally to two or more subjects or objects.” Darden v.
Bright, 173 Md. 563, 569, 198 A. 431 (1938). Extrinsic evidence
is generally admissible to resolve a latent ambiguity.
Monmonier v. Monmonier, 258 Md. 387, 390, 266 A.2d 17
(1970); Bradford v. Eutaw Savings Bank, 186 Md. 127, 136, 46
36

Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 7 at 530.
Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886) (5-4 decision).
38 Id. at 213-14.
39 Id. at 214, 219-20.
40 Id. at 217.
41 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 11.1 cmt. c. (2003).
42 Emmert v. Hearn, 522 A.2d 377, 380-82 (Md. 1987).
37
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A.2d 284 (1946); Fersinger v. Martin, [183 Md. 135, 138-39], 36
A.2d 716 (1944); Darden v. Bright, supra, 173 Md. at 569, 198
A. 431; Cassilly v. Devenny, 168 Md. 443, 449, 177 A. 919
(1935). Indeed a latent ambiguity is “not discoverable until extrinsic evidence is introduced to identify the beneficiaries or
the property disposed of by will, when it is developed by such
evidence, either that the description in the will is defective, or
that it applies equally to two or more persons or things.” 4 W.
Bowe & D. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills § 32.7, p. 255
(rev. ed. 1961).43
A technical reading of the phrase “personal property” in Emmert
may obviate the pour-over provision of the will, but that does not convert a patent ambiguity to a latent ambiguity. A Florida court, wrestling
with the identical issue, permitted extrinsic evidence to interpret the
phrase “personal property” in the will to mean only tangible personal
property.44 The Florida court acknowledged that the phrase has an established technical meaning: “Every lawyer learns that the term personal property includes both tangible and intangible property.”45
Nevertheless, the court saw an ambiguity because of the effect that the
technical meaning would have on the other provisions of the will. It
permitted the extrinsic evidence to narrow that unambiguous, technical
meaning.46 As for the Maryland approach, the Florida court stated,
“Nothing is to be gained by the strained distinction of Emmert and we
treat it as a minority view in conflict with the view expressed here.”47
Since this decision, Florida codified sweeping use of extrinsic evidence
in will interpretation matters, completely untethered by whether an ambiguity exists.48 This approach is advanced by the Restatement (Third)
of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers.49

43

Id. at 381-82.
In re Estate of Walker, 609 So. 2d 623, 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc).
45 Id. at 624.
46 See id. at 625.
47 Id.
48 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.615 (West 2010) (permitting a court to reform the terms of
a will, “even if unambiguous,” to conform to the testator’s intent.). This parallels the
UTC’s treatment of testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See Unif. Trust Code § 415
(2010) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the
terms to the settlor’s intention . . . .”).
49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.1 (2003).
44
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2. Common Law Exception to the Plain Meaning Rule for
Surrounding Circumstances
The second exception to the plain meaning rule – that evidence of
the circumstances surrounding and informing the testator’s situation is
admissible if there is either a patent or latent ambiguity – has likewise
been long-standing. The document is meant to be read in the context of
the testator’s circumstances:
No such unqualified rule [the plain meaning rule] can
stand in the face of the numerous cases admitting some extrinsic evidence where the indefiniteness, inaccuracy, or ambiguity
was apparent on the face of the instrument. . . .
According to the better view, or the more accurate statement of the true rule, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show
the situation of the testator and all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time of the making of the
will, for the purpose of explaining or resolving even a patent
ambiguity.50
The surrounding circumstances exception to the plain meaning rule pays
tribute to the importance of context. The document is meant to be understood as the testator understood it – against the backdrop of his or
her occupation, property holdings, and relationships with family and
others.51 The purpose of this extrinsic evidence is to frame the settlor’s
point of view when he or she drafts the document:
Of the competency of this evidence there can be no doubt.
The purpose of it was to place the court, as far as possible, in
the situation in which the testator stood, and thus bring the
words employed by him into contact with the circumstances
attending the execution of the will. Such proof does not contradict the terms of that instrument, nor tend to wrest the
words of the testator from their natural operation. It serves
only to identify the institutions described by him as “the board
of foreign and the board of home missions;” and thus the court
is enabled to avail itself of the light which the circumstances, in
which the testator was placed at the time he made the will,
would throw upon his intention. “The law is not so unreasonable,” says Mr. Wigram, “as to deny to the reader of an instru50 R.T. Kimbrough, Annotation, Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Aid Interpretation of Will, 94 A.L.R. 26, 57-58 (1935) (citations omitted).
51 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§10.2 cmt. d.
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ment the same light which the writer enjoyed.” Wigram on
Wills, 2d Amer. ed. 161.52
Thus, courts look to the particular circumstances of a decedent to
ascertain the plain meaning of the words used:
If we put ourselves, in the traditional place, behind the
armchair of the testator as he contemplates the disposition he
wished to be made to the objects of his bounty, we would be
standing behind a man who was not unaware of the problems
and methods of early, as contrasted to late, vesting of trust estates and one upon whom had been urged the desirability of
continuing property in trust.53
This exception to the plain meaning rule that enables the courts to
sit in a testator’s “armchair” does not permit direct evidence of actual
intent itself, but may yield a close approximation. In the case where the
testator was “not unaware” of the consequences of early vesting, for
example, the court addressed the meaning of the phrase, “upon the
youngest living grandchild of [the testator’s sister] . . . attaining the age
of twenty-one years,” in a testamentary trust.54 The court concluded
that the phrase could have one of two different interpretations – vesting
either, when the sister’s grandchildren then in being had all reached
twenty-one years of age as of any point in time, or after all of the sister’s
children had died (thus closing the class) and the youngest grandchild
reached twenty-one years of age.55 The court opted for the second reading based on the extrinsic evidence of the testator’s situation. The evidence was that early vesting had caused adverse tax issues in the
testator’s mother’s estate and that he was therefore urged, upon receiving assets from his family, to continue those assets in trust. Examining
the circumstances at the time of the execution of his will, in order to
place the court in his “armchair” at the critical moment, required extensive extrinsic evidence in order to interpret what certain words in his
testamentary trust meant.56 The extrinsic evidence established his intent, although the language of the trust created a patent, not a latent,
ambiguity.

52 Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U.S. 586, 590, 595 (1887). Noting that many denominations
had foreign and home missions; the decedent, however, probably meant the Presbyterian
mission because of his connections with that church. See id.
53 Marty v. First Nat’l Bank of Balt., 120 A.2d 841, 845 (Md. 1956).
54 Id. at 843, 845.
55 See id. at 844.
56 See id. at 845-47.
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3. Other “Exceptions” to the Plain Meaning Rule
Not rising to an exception to the plain meaning rule per se, there
are cases that nevertheless permit direct extrinsic evidence of a testator’s intent. Many of these cases revolve around the issue of testamentary capacity, which opens the door for extrinsic evidence to reflect on
whether or not the disposition in the challenged will was “natural.”57 In
one case, a will was challenged solely based on whether it properly followed the testamentary formalities and whether that document was, in
fact, an expression of the testatrix’s last wishes.58 The testatrix was ill,
facing surgery, and had executed two wills within two days of each
other. The wills were dramatically different from each other. The second will was upheld despite the fact that the last name of a legatee had
been crossed out and a new name substituted by hand in the will. The
court based its ruling that the second will was valid on the parol evidence offered by witnesses to the will that the actual intent of the testatrix as expressed to them was reflected in the second will not in the first
will.59 Additionally, because the second will was more in line with the
testatrix’s older wills, this evidence likewise demonstrated that she
would have wanted to have the provisions that were contained in the
second will apply at her death.60
In another case, where the testatrix signed a document purporting
to be her will when she was ill and under the influence of narcotics, the
will challenge was based on whether the decedent knew the contents of
the document that she had signed.61 That, in turn, raised the issue of
what she had attempted to accomplish with her will (what her intent
was) and whether the signed document accomplished that intent. The
court held that in these “unusual and exceptional” circumstances, extrinsic evidence of the draftsman’s error could be used to support the
contention that she had not read and understood her will before signing
it; thus, it should not have been admitted to probate.62
4. The Plain Meaning Rule May Not Be Applicable To Inter
Vivos Trusts
The restrictions imposed by the plain meaning rule on the introduction of extrinsic evidence of intent do not apply to inter vivos trusts: “If
the meaning of the writing is uncertain or ambiguous, evidence of the
57

See 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 102 (2013).
See Gage v. Hooper, 169 A. 925, 926 (Md. 1934).
59 See id. at 926-27.
60 See id. at 927.
61 See Lyon v. Townsend, 91 A. 704, 707, 711 (Md. 1914).
62 Id. at 713; see also V. Woerner, Annotation, Effect of Mistake of Draftsmen
(Other Than Testator) in Drawing Will, 90 A.L.R. 2D 924, 936 (1963).
58
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circumstances is admissible to determine its interpretation.”63 Such evidence is permitted to aid in the construction of the language of an inter
vivos trust:
Oral evidence will be received, however, to remove an
ambiguity in the construction of the trust instrument by explanation of the meaning of the words therein, based on the situation of the parties and other facts. This principle [applies] . . .
to private and charitable trusts.64
Indeed, in most jurisdictions a trust of personalty may be created
wholly by parol evidence.65 Because parol evidence can be used to interpret trusts that were created inter vivos, parol evidence may also be
used to reform or modify such a trust.
As a general rule, inter vivos trusts, but not testamentary trusts, are
reformable to comport with the “actual” intent of the settlor, which may
be proved by extrinsic evidence:
In trust law, a settlor’s unilateral mistake is sufficient to
reform an inter vivos trust, provided the settlor received no
consideration for the creation of the trust. The same rule applies even after the death of the settlor, provided the reformation is necessary to carry out his intent. Courts have frequently
corrected scriveners’ errors by reforming unilateral mistakes in
trust instruments. In addition, courts have corrected omissions
resulting from scriveners’ mistakes. Because a revocable inter
vivos trust can imitate a will, in that the settlor can retain the
equitable life interest and the power to alter or revoke the beneficiary designation, the differing result hinges on terminology.
Significantly, a scrivener’s error can serve as a basis to reform a
pour over will. A court, however, generally will not reform a
testamentary trust under similar circumstances, unless the will
which contained the trust can be reformed. It seems arbitrary
63

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 38 cmt. a. (1959).
BOGERT, supra note 16. See also id. § 88 (“The courts have, however, distinguished between using oral evidence to supply a term entirely missing and offering oral
testimony to clear up ambiguities, explain doubtful terms, and give a setting to the writing. If all of the essential elements of the writing are present, they may be clarified by
non-documentary evidence.”).
65 See Shaffer v. Lohr, 287 A.2d 42, 48 (Md. 1972) (noting that a joint bank account
was regarded as an inter vivos trust because an expression of clear and unmistakable
intent to create such a trust could be proved by parol evidence). Presumably, the Shaffer
decision would be now impacted by Maryland’s multiple account statute. Parol evidence
can also be used to establish a resulting and constructive trust, including such trusts regarding land. See Jahnigen v. Smith, 795 A.2d 234, 240 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Fasman v. Pottashnick, 51 A.2d 664, 666 (Md. 1947).
64
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for the law to hold that an inter vivos trust used as a receptacle
for assets poured over from probate can be reformed, while a
testamentary trust cannot. If will substitutes, including revocable trusts, can be reformed for scriveners’ errors, then wills
should also be able to be reformed under similar circumstances, especially when both kinds of instruments accomplish
the same testamentary objectives.66
Cases hold that after the death of the settlor, the beneficiary could press
for a modification of an inter vivos trust due to mistake to the same
degree that the settlor could have brought such an action for modification of an irrevocable inter vivos trust.67
C. The Plain Meaning Rule Under the UTC
As noted, the plain meaning rule has been criticized as a barrier to
applying a settlor’s actual intent when interpreting a document.
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers “disapprove[s]” of the plain meaning rule.68 Thus, section 12.1
(“Reforming Donative Documents to Correct Mistakes”) permits extrinsic evidence of settlor intent “to conform the text [of the will or testamentary trust] to donor’s intention” even if the text of the document is
unambiguous:
When a donative document is unambiguous, evidence suggesting that the terms of the document vary from intention is
inherently suspect but possibly correct. The law deals with situations of inherently suspicious but possibly correct evidence
in either of two ways. One is to exclude the evidence altogether, in effect denying a remedy in cases in which the evidence is genuine and persuasive. The other is to consider the
evidence, but guard against giving effect to fraudulent or mistaken evidence by imposing an above-normal standard of
proof. In choosing between exclusion and high-safeguard allowance of extrinsic evidence, this Restatement adopts the latter. Only high-safeguard allowance of extrinsic evidence
66 Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scriveners’ Errors: The
Argument for Reformation, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
67 See Kiser v. Lucas, 185 A. 441, 446 (Md. 1936); Roos v. Roos, 203 A.2d 140, 142
(Del. Ch. 1964) (citing Kiser for the proposition that a declaration of trust may be
amended to reflect the intent of the settlor after his or her death).
68 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.1 cmt. d. (2003). No pretense is made that the reworking of the rule by the Restatement is based on case law development.
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achieves the primary objective of giving effect to the donor’s
intention.69
The UTC follows a similar approach:
SECTION 415. REFORMATION TO CORRECT MISTAKES. The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if
unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if
it is proved by clear and convincing evidence what the settlor’s
intention was and that the terms of the trust were affected by a
mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.70
Both approaches impose a “clear and convincing” standard to guard
against fraudulent testimony.
It is clear from the comments under UTC section 415 that it is
meant to abolish the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts and accordingly make the proof issue the same for a testamentary trust as with
an inter vivos trust. UTC section 415, however, does not stop there. It
authorizes extrinsic evidence to reform a trust even if its terms are not
ambiguous.
UTC section 415 accordingly makes a radical change to the proof of
settlor intent for both inter vivos and testamentary trusts. On its face,
however, UTC section 415 appears rather benign. Given the long history of courts embracing the plain meaning rule, it may be necessary to
demonstrate that UTC section 415 was specifically meant to incorporate
the approach of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers section 12.1 to counteract the rich case law that relied on the plain meaning rule to exclude extrinsic evidence in those
circumstances.
II. THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE
A. The Dead Man’s Statute in General
Dead man’s statutes have been widely disapproved by scholars and
judges.71 Indeed, most jurisdictions have abandoned the dead man’s
69

Id. § 12.1 cmt. b.
Unif. Trust Code § 415 (2010).
71 See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 502 (1975) (“[T]he dead man statutes are widely condemned among commentators and practitioners. To Wigmore, ‘the exclusion is an intolerable injustice,’ since
‘cross-examination and other safeguards for truth are a significant guarantee against false
decision.’ As long ago as 1938 the American Bar Association’s Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence voted disapproval of dead man statutes by the margin
of forty-six to three, following a national survey of professional and judicial opinion.”)
(footnotes omitted).
70
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statute.72 Nevertheless, these statutes continue in some form in over
one-third of U.S. jurisdictions.73
At early common law, an interested party – one with a stake in the
outcome of the proceedings – was viewed as inherently untrustworthy
and therefore was rendered incompetent to testify:
The theory of disqualification by interest was merely one variety of the general theory which underlay the extensive rules of
incompetency at common law. It was reducible in its essence
to a syllogism, both premises of which, though they may now
seem fallacious enough, were accepted in the 1700s as axioms
of truth: Total exclusion from the stand is the proper safeguard
against a false decision, whenever the persons offered are of a
class specially likely to speak falsely; persons having a pecuniary interest in the event of the cause are specially likely to
speak falsely; therefore such persons should be totally
excluded.74
Dead man’s statutes constitute part of these more general witness incompetency rules, one designed “to close the mouth of an interested
survivor” in suits involving transactions with a decedent.75
B. The Impact of the Federal Rule of Evidence
After years of debate and study, the Warren Court promulgated
Federal Rules of Evidence to govern all trials in the federal courts.76
Those rules contained Rule 601, which generally eliminated the common law witness incompetency rules.77 Justice Douglas, however, questioned whether the Court had authority to promulgate evidentiary rules
that effectively alter the substantive outcome of a case solely based on
its removal to the federal court. Based on this objection, the rules of
evidence as promulgated by the federal courts were transmitted to Congress for consideration.78 Congress revised Rule 601 to continue al72 See Ed Wallis, An Outdated Form of Evidentiary Law: A Survey of Dead Man’s
Statutes and a Proposal for Change, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 75, 76-77 n.9 (2005-06). Mr.
Wallis lists 32 states that have expressly rejected the dead man’s statute. See Appendix,
infra, for a more up-to-date and comprehensive list. The Appendix lists 30 jurisdictions
as not recognizing or repealing the statute. The remaining jurisdictions either recognize
it fully or with some degree of limitation.
73 See infra Appendix.
74 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 576.
75 See Joseph A. Colquitt & Charles W. Gamble, From Incompetency to Weight and
Creditability: The Next Step in an Historic Trend, 47 ALA. L. REV. 145, 145 (1995).
76 See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 2-3 (1973).
77 See id. at 9.
78 See id. at 3-4.
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lowing witness disqualification if a dead man’s statute was recognized as
part of the relevant state law:
The greatest controversy centered around [Rule 601’s] rendering inapplicable in the federal courts the so-called Dead Man’s
Statutes which exist in some States. Acknowledging that there
is substantial disagreement as to the merit of Dead Man’s Statutes, the Committee nevertheless believed that where such
statutes have been enacted they represent State policy which
should not be overturned in the absence of a compelling federal interest.79
Thus, in its final form, continued today but for stylistic changes, Federal
Rule of Evidence 601 sweeps away the common law witness incompetency rules but for that imposed by the dead man’s statutes:
This general ground-clearing [of Federal Rule of Evidence
601] eliminates all grounds for incompetency not specifically
recognized in the succeeding rules of this Article. Included
among the grounds this abolished are religious belief, conviction of a crime, and connection with the litigation as a party or
interested person or spouse of a party or interested person.
With the exception of the so-called Dead Man’s Acts, American jurisdictions generally have ceased to recognize these
grounds.
The Dead Man’s Acts are surviving traces of the common
law disqualification of parties and interested persons.80
Those jurisdictions without a dead man’s statute permit the historicallyexcluded testimony to be heard, with the fact finder charged with “determining the weight and creditability of a witness’s testimony.”81
Most states have adopted all or part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 601 either in their original or revised form.82
Ironically, several jurisdictions have used its version of Rule 601 to overturn existing dead man’s statutes regardless of their carve-out, explicitly
permitted by Congressional action. The Arkansas court, for example,
held that its dead man’s statute was repealed by its Rule 601: “[the dead
79

Id. at 9.
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 262
(U.S. 1973) (Advisory Comm. Note to Rule 601).
81 See Colquitt & Gamble supra note 75, at 175-76. Although Rule 601 swept away
the broad categories of disqualified witnesses, that does not mean that anyone, including
persons with no comprehension, may testify. See id. at 146 nn. 6-7. Federal Rule of
Evidence 603 requires that a witness must be able to affirm that he or she will testify
truthfully. See FED. R. EVID. 603.
82 See infra Appendix.
80
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man’s statute] was in fact expressly repealed by the Uniform Rules of
Evidence.”83 Other jurisdictions have more straightforwardly repealed
their statutes.84
C. The Application of the Dead Man’s Statute Where Not Repealed
Those seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence of settlor intent must
contend with the dead man’s statutes in those jurisdictions that continue
to retain such statutes. The extent to which such statutes impose a barrier to extrinsic evidence of settlor intent depends, to a large degree, on
the nature of the specific statute and its interpretation.
Some jurisdictions take a traditional approach and apply the dead
man’s statute to exclude testimony of settlor intent from a party with a
stake in the outcome of the case. For instance, Illinois is a state with
broad, traditional prohibition on testimony and its courts enforce that
broad prohibition.85 Under the Illinois statute, “no adverse party or
person directly interested in the action shall be allowed to testify on his
or her own behalf to any conversation with the deceased [person] . . . or
to any event which took place in the presence of the deceased [person].”86 Beneficiaries and putative beneficiaries have sufficient interests
in the estate to trigger the dead man’s statute under Illinois law: In a
case seeking to impose a constructive trust on a specific bequest, the
putative beneficiary’s testimony was not permitted.87 The court held the
dead man’s statute was not merely to guard against the impairment of
83

Davis v. Hare, 561 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ark. 1978).
Florida, for example, adopted Rule 601 in 1976, which mirrored the federal
model. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.601 (West 2011) (“Every person is competent to be a
witness, except as otherwise provided by statute.”). Florida’s dead man’s statute was then
repealed in 2005. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.602 (West 2011) (repealed 2005).
85 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-201 (West Supp. 2014); Murphy v. Hook, 316
N.E.2d 146, 151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). In Murphy, a wrongful death action by an estate
against a defendant motorist, neither the defendant motorist nor his spouse could testify
to the facts of the accident under Illinois’ dead man’s statute. (They claimed that the
decedent was on the wrong side of the road.) In that action, the estate relied exclusively
on accident reconstruction experts and did not offer any testimony from the decedent’s
spouse-administrator who was in the car at the time of the accident. See Murphy, 316
N.E.2d at 149-51. Such testimony, if offered, would have constituted a waiver of the
prohibition. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-201(a). Another Illinois case, a suit in
federal court applying the Illinois dead man’s statute, dismissed a case for fraud against a
deceased unlicensed business broker because the plaintiff would need to testify about the
business dealings with the decedent in order to prevail. The federal judge observed:
“While [the dismissal] may seem an inequitable result, courts have entered summary
judgment where the plaintiff lacks sufficient proof to support his case after his own testimony has been inadmissible pursuant to the Dead Man’s Act.” Zang v. Alliance Fin.
Servs. of Ill., 875 F Supp. 2d 865, 869, 873, 886 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
86 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-201.
87 See Kamberos v. Magnuson, 510 N.E.2d 112, 114-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
84
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the estate, but also to defend the legacies set out in the will.88 It is a
statute, however, meant to preclude only those with an actual stake in
the outcome from testifying. Merely being a party to the action is not
enough. In a dispute between the residuary beneficiaries of a trust and
the intestate takers, the trustee of the trust was permitted to testify as to
transfers of property to the trust regardless of being an essential, named
party. The testimony of the trustee, although a formal party to the suit,
was proper because she had no pecuniary stake in the outcome of the
suit.89
Although imposing silence on those with a direct stake in the outcome of the proceeding, Illinois has a series of cases permitting the
drafting lawyer to testify. Generally these decisions are based on the
draftsperson not having a sufficient “interest” in the outcome of the case
to pull him or her into the operation of the statute.90 In one case, the
attorney was permitted to testify as to the settlors’ intent to transfer real
property to a trust for the benefit of some, but not all, of their children
and grandchildren. Although the attorney testified to preparing and
overseeing the execution of the deeds, no deeds could be found. The
disinherited heirs objected to the attorney’s testimony on the basis that
he had a definite interest in the outcome of the suit and that he had, in
fact, notified his insurance carrier of a potential malpractice case against
him. The court disagreed, noting that he had no direct interest in the
suit and that there was no suit against him, thereby making the purported “interest” in the proceeding speculative.91
Before amendments to its statute, Colorado’s dead man’s statute
was similar to that of Illinois.92 A Colorado court likewise permitted
the attorney to testify as a fact witness regardless of the operation of the
88 See id.; See also In re Estate of Fisher, No. 4-11-1125, 2012 WL 7041057, at *6 (Ill.
App. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012) (applying the dead man’s statute to defend an heir’s bequest
regardless of how the suit is structured).
89 Herron v. Underwood, 503 N.E.2d 1111, 1117-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Appellants
argued that while the trustee may not have had a monetary stake in the outcome, she had
a “definite emotional interest in seeing that her brother’s ‘new wife’ did not get her hands
on the estate.” The court held that the disqualifying interest had to be of a pecuniary
nature and that the emotional stake in the outcome merely went to the trustee’s
credibility.
90 See, e.g., Michalski v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 365 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977); Estate of Hurst v. Hurst, 769 N.E.2d 55, 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (permitting the
attorney to testify where a related malpractice case was pending, noting that to be disqualified from testifying, “[t]he interest of the witness must be direct and be such that a
pecuniary gain or loss will inure to the witness directly as the immediate result of the
judgment.’); Ball v. Kotter, No. 08-CV-1613, 2012 WL 987223, at *8 (N.D. Ill. March 22,
2012) aff’d, 723 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2013).
91 Michalski, 365 N.E.2d at 655-57.
92 See infra note 95.
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dead man’s statute under the prior law because the attorney lacked a
direct interest in the outcome of the suit.93 It observed: “We are aware
of only one instance in which an attorney, by reason of his services, was
determined to have gained an interest in the outcome of the litigation to
warrant disqualification of his testimony. This arises when the attorney
has entered into a contingent fee agreement with his client.”94 Generally, however, the attorney may testify.95
Other jurisdictions have narrowed the scope of their dead man’s
statutes by applying them only to a limited category of cases – generally
those that impact the size or obligations of the estate. The Maryland
court, for example, narrows the scope of the application of its statute by
making an exception to the general rule of the desirability of the inclusion of all possible evidence:
The purpose of the Statute . . . is to prevent the surviving
party from having the benefit of his own testimony where, by
reason of the death of his adversary, his representative is deprived of the decedent’s version of the transaction or statement. Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 116 A.2d 145 (1955). This
disability, while protecting the deceased’s estate, can create a
great injustice to the survivor. As was stated in C. McCormick,
Evidence, § 65 (2d ed. 1972):
“Most commentators agree that the expedient of refusing
[to] listen to the survivor is, in the words of Bentham, a
‘blind and brainless’ technique. In seeking to avoid injustice to one side, the statute-makers have ignored the equal
possibility of creating injustice to the other. The temptation to the survivor to fabricate a claim or defense is obvious enough, so obvious indeed that any jury will realize
that his story must be cautiously heard.”
Faced with the uncertainty and injustice created by the
Dead Man’s Statute, the Maryland Courts have sought to con93

See David v. Powder Mountain Ranch, 656 P.2d 716, 718 (Colo. App. 1982).
Id.; see also Lee v. Leibold, 79 P.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Colo. 1938) (excluding the
testimony of an attorney, who represented a claimant on a contingent fee basis in a contractual dispute against an estate).
95 In its 2012 revision, Colorado went from a traditional common law model to an
approach permitting an interested party to testify as long the testimony “is corroborated
by material evidence of an independent and trustworthy nature.” COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN § 13-90-102 (West 2014). Then, in 2013, it struck the requirement that the testimony
had to be “independent“ and defined “corroborated” as evidence that does not need to
“support the verdict but must tend to confirm and strengthen the testimony of the witness and show the probability of its truth.” 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 767. The 2013 revisions explicitly permit the testimony of the scrivener. See id.
94
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strue strictly the Statute in an effort to disclose as much evidence as the rule will allow.96
In keeping with this general approach, the Maryland court has restricted
the dead man’s statute to situations that would “‘tend to increase or
diminish the estate of a decedent by establishing or defeating a cause of
action by or against the estate.’”97 The testimony of caveators and
caveatees about statements made by the decedent, for example, is permitted because such testimony will not result in a judgment at law
against the estate.98 In an action challenging the appointment of an estate’s personal representative on the basis of his status as a creditor to
the decedent, the court held that the creditor could testify to his dealings
with the decedent to establish that he was such a creditor. The court
reasoned that, while the testimony was proper in a proceeding as to the
correctness of his appointment, he would nevertheless encounter great
evidentiary challenges when he thereafter tried to establish his claim for
the purpose of asserting it against the estate.99
Similarly, the Tennessee dead man’s statute is interpreted narrowly
because of policy considerations:
This statute cannot be extended by the courts to cases not
within its terms upon the idea they fall within the evil which
was intended to be guarded against. As an exception, it must
be strictly construed as against the exclusion of the testimony
and in favor of it admission.100
As with Maryland, Tennessee holds that the operation of its statute does
“not apply to cases where the transaction about which the testimony was
offered did not increase or diminish the decedent’s estate but concerned
only the manner in which the assets will be distributed.”101 Accordingly, in a latent ambiguity case, testimony by a party was permitted to
clarify what the decedent meant by a phrase in her will.102
96

Reddy v. Mody, 388 A.2d 555, 560 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
Soothcage’s Estate v. King, 176 A.2d 221, 226 (Md. 1961) (quoting, as “a correct
statement of the law of Maryland,” Riley v. Lukens Dredging & Contracting Corp., 4 F.
Supp. 144, 147 (D. Md. 1933) (Chestnut, J.).
98 See Griffith v. Benzinger, 125 A. 512, 520 (Md. 1924).
99 See Soothcage’s Estate, 176 A.2d at 222, 226.
100 Haynes v. Cumberland Builders, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 228, 230-31 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1976).
101 Cantrell v. Estate of Cantrell, 19 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding the exclusion of testimony because the widow claimed a year of support payments in
addition to the elective share).
102 See Horadam v. Stewart, No. M2007-00046-COA-R3-C7, 2008 WL 4491744, at *7
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2008).
97
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Other states have modified dead man’s statutes to permit otherwise
disqualified testimony as long as it is corroborated independently. Virginia, for example, takes this approach, which
is designed to prevent a litigant from having the benefit of his
own testimony when, because of death or incapacity, the personal representative of another litigant has been deprived of
the testimony of the decedent or incapacitated person. The
statute substitutes a requirement that testimony be corroborated in place of the harsher common law rule which disqualified the surviving witnesses for interest.103
The corroboration must be from a disinterested party who is not financially interested in the outcome of the case.104 Thus, the spouse who
“will share in the inheritance” of a party could not be the corroborating
witness.105
III. THE HEARSAY RULE
A. The History of the State of Mind/Intent Exception to the
Hearsay Rule
Most jurisdictions have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3),
or a version of it, which sets out an exception to the hearsay rule to
permit declarations of intention.106 In its current form, Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(3) excepts from the general prohibition against hearsay
statement[s] of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind
(such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health),
but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or
terms of the declarant’s will.107
103 Diehl v. Butts, 499 S.E.2d 833, 837-38 (Va. 1998) (holding that a confidential relationship increases the degree of corroboration needed).
104 See Stephens v. Caruthers, 97 F. Supp. 2d 698, 705 (E.D. Va. 2000).
105 See id. at 707. Interestingly, Maryland, with an arguably stricter exclusionary
rule, would permit a spouse to testify regardless of the interest. See Marx v. Marx, 96 A.
544, 547-48 (Md. 1916).
106 See infra Appendix.
107 FED. R. EVID. 803(3). Rule 803(3) was rewritten in 2011 from the original 1975
version for stylistic, not substantive, reasons. See Symposium, The Restyled Rules of Federal Evidence, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1435, 1440, 1462 (2012). In its original form the
exception covered “statement[s] of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain,
and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or
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This is a true exception: it permits a third party to testify as to what
the declarant said about his or her plan or intention, including in the
case of testamentary documents, a memory or belief about what the declarant intended by a then-existing document.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) is informed by two early United
States Supreme Court cases, neither relating to wills or trusts. Those
cases, however, explain why Rule 803(3) has its tortured syntax (“but
not including . . . unless it relates to”). The first case, Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon, established a broad exception to permit hearsay as to statements made by a decedent as to something that
person planned to do in the future to prove, or tend to prove, that the
person did exactly what he or she said that he or she would do.108
Hillmon was an insurance fraud case where a woman claimed her husband died in a certain remote location thereby entitling her to the death
benefits from several policies. The insurance company acknowledged
that someone had, in fact, died in that remote location, but that it was
not Mr. Hillmon but a Mr. Walter. As evidence, the insurance company
wanted to introduce letters from Mr. Walter saying he planned to go to
that remote location.109 The evidence was held admissible to demonstrate that Mr. Walter probably went to the remote location110 – a very
broad exception to the hearsay rule.111 The second case, Shepard v.
United States, involved a murder trial where the defendant, Dr. Shepard,
was charged with poisoning his wife.112 The evidence sought to be used
was the testimony of the deceased wife who said that she had some liquor from a bottle immediately before she became ill that tasted odd,
and further, that “Dr. Shepard has poisoned me.”113 The court held the
statement to be inadmissible: “Declarations, of intention, casting light
upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of
memory, pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or
nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if this distinction were
ignored.”114
terms of declarant’s will.” See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1926,
1939 (1975).
108 See Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 296, 299-300 (1892).
109 See id. at 285-87.
110 See id. at 299-300.
111 In some instances, the proponent wants to introduce forward-looking hearsay to
prove someone other than the declarant did something. This raises thorny due process
issues. See Lynn McLain, “I’m Going to Dinner with Frank”: Admissibility of Nontestimonial Statements of Intent to Prove the Actions of Someone Other Than the Speaker –
and the Role of the Due Process Clause, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 379, 383 (2010).
112 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 97 (1933).
113 Id. at 98.
114 Id. at 105-06. (Nor did the statements qualify as a dying declaration under the
facts of the case. Id. at 99-102.)
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The Hillmon situation involved a forward-looking statement of intent: Mr. Walter said he was going somewhere, so he probably went
there after making the statement. Rule 803(3) carves out these forwardlooking statements of intent as a general hearsay rule exception, not just
an exception because the statement relates to a testamentary instrument. This exception, of course, applies equally to showing testator or
settlor intent.115
Rule 803(3) appears to permit, however, backward-looking declarations of intent if these declarations relate to the terms of the declarant’s
will. This is at variance to the Shepard-type prohibition which may well
disallow the hearsay exception as to a testator’s statements. Backwardlooking statements related to the declarant’s will were carved out based
on expediency:
The carving out, from the exclusion mentioned in the preceding paragraph, of declarations relating to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of the declarant’s will represents an ad hoc judgment which finds ample reinforcement in
the decisions, resting on practical grounds of necessity and expediency rather than logic.116
B. Modern Application of the Hearsay Rule
A Maryland case illustrates the backward looking element of 803(3)
and how statements by a testatrix after execution of a will may be admissible to show how she meant the will to be interpreted. National
Society of Daughters of American Revolution v. Goodman involved
whether a restricted gift to the Daughters of the American Revolution
(DAR) for the purpose of funding its nursing home facility lapsed because the DAR, in fact, did not maintain a nursing home.117 The decedent had prepared a will leaving part of her estate to Gallaudet
University and part of her estate to the DAR for the nursing home.
After execution, the attorney contacted the DAR to discuss the gift and
learned that the DAR did not maintain a nursing home. He thereupon
contacted his client who said that she did not intend any gift to go to the
DAR in that situation but all to Gallaudet University. The attorney pre115 See In re Sayewich’s Estate, 413 A.2d 581, 584 (N.H. 1980); Engle v. Siegel, 377
A.2d 892, 894, 896 (N.J. 1977). Both cases permitted the scriveners to testify as to what
the testators wished to accomplish in their wills as long as the testimony did not contradict the terms of the wills. See In re Sayewich’s Estate, 413 A.2d at 584; Engle, 377 A.2d
at 894, 896.
116 Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 306
(U.S. 1973) (Advisory Comm. Note to Rule 803).
117 See Nat’l Soc’y of Daughters of Am. Revolution v. Goodman, 736 A.2d 1205,
1209-10 (Md. App. 1999).
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pared a new will, but his client died before she was able to execute the
new will.118 Nevertheless, the testimony was permitted as a backward
looking declaration of what she intended by her original will.119
Another Maryland case followed suit. In YIVO Institute for Jewish
Research v. Zalenski, the decedent left a bequest in his will to a charity
and then he later made a gift to the same institution.120 The issue was
whether the subsequent gift adeemed the bequest in the will. The testimony sought to be excluded was that of a friend who said that the decedent declared years after making the subsequent charitable gift, that he
did not need to change his will because the charitable institution would
understand that the gift that he had made was adeeming the bequest in
the will. Such testimony was admitted.121
South Carolina, on the other hand, takes the opposite view, holding
that a later statement related to funding a bequest was not admissible
because it did not show the testatrix’s intent when she executed her will.
In In Estate of Gill v. Clemson University Foundation, the testatrix left a
$100,000 bequest to the Clemson University Foundation to fund a scholarship for “academically deserving football players.”122 Later, she designated the scholarship fund as the payee of a $100,000 IRA. Clemson
saw this as two $100,000 gifts, whereas the estate contended the IRA
designation was how the testatrix funded her one bequest to the
school.123 The court excluded testimony of what the testatrix told her
advisors when setting up the IRA designation because it was “not made
at the time of the Will to show her belief at that time” and therefore
violated Rule 803(3).124
CONCLUSION
The phrase “terms of the trust” is defined as the manifestation of
the settlor intent “expressed in a manner that admits of its proof in judicial proceedings.”125 Under the UTC, extrinsic evidence of settlor intent may be used regardless of whether the language in the instrument is
ambiguous.126 Indeed, such evidence may be introduced even to contra118

Id. at 1207-08.
Id. at 1209-10.
120 See YIVO Inst. for Jewish Research v. Zalenski, 874 A.2d 411, 414-15 (Md. 2005).
121 Id. at 422-23.
122 See In Estate of Gill v. Clemson Univ. Foundation, 725 S.E.2d 516, 519 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2012).
123 See id.
124 Id. at 521.
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 (2003); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 4 (1959); Restatement (First) of Trusts § 4 (1935).
126 Unif. Trust Code § 415 (2010).
119

Spring 2014]

EVIDENCE OF SETTLOR INTENT

29

dict the otherwise unambiguous language of the trust instrument.127
Thus, under the UTC, the only barriers to enhancing the terms of the
trust with extrinsic material are either the dead man’s statute, where it
still exists, or the hearsay rule, to the extent that rule precludes such
extrinsic evidence.
In jurisdictions that have not adopted the UTC, to the extent a general rule may be said to exist, different evidentiary rules may apply for
testamentary trusts and inter vivos trusts. There is no logical reason for
this difference. Nevertheless, these differences can be outcome-determinative in a particular case.
For attorneys charged with drafting trusts, the goal ought to be to
capture settlor intent within the four corners of the instrument regardless of the extrinsic evidence rules. This can be an elusive goal. Language, even supposedly precise language, can prove slippery.
There is a long line of cases involving beneficiaries and trustees arguing over the proper exercise of discretionary distributions.128 These
arguments may be reduced, if not avoided, by spelling out settlor intent
beyond the use of generic phrases:
One of the most difficult tasks trustees face is how to exercise broad (and generic) discretion in the administration of
trusts, whether the trust is fully discretionary, with no standards whatsoever, or discretionary subject to an ascertainable
standard. To the extent that the settlor’s intent is expressed in
the trust, it is much easier for the trustee to carry out that intent. For example, if the primary purpose of passing property
in trust, rather than outright, is to gain tax and asset protection
advantages, and separating the control over the property from
the beneficial enjoyment of the property (more than necessary
to obtain tax and asset protection benefits) is not a primary
motivation behind using a trust, then the trust can be drafted
to make the intent clear, so that the trustee can act more liberally than might be the case where control is a key issue.129
Another approach would be to set forth settlor intent in a side “letter of wishes.” Such a document, although precatory, would offer practical guidance to the fiduciary:
As attorneys, we habitually draft discretionary trusts offering
no real guidance to the trustees in the exercise of their discretion with respect to distributions to beneficiaries. And despite
127

Id.
See 76 AM. JUR.2D Trusts § 550 (2005).
129 Benjamin H. Pruett, Tales from the Dark Side: Drafting Issues from the Fiduciary’s Perspective, 35 ACTEC J. 331, 341 (2010).
128
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the obvious shortcomings of this approach and the causal treatment of this critical element of a trust, we continue the practice. Instead, I believe we should strongly encourage each
settlor to provide a non-binding written expression of the manner in which she would like to see the trustee exercise his discretion, so that the administration of her trust will have a good
chance of reflecting the manner in which the settlor herself
would have administered it.130
Whether contained in the trust instrument, or as a side letter of wishes
directed to the trustee, these statements of settlor intent are usually
precatory guidance, not mandatory instructions. The fiduciary must still
exercise discretion.131
In any event, the drafting attorney should memorialize the settlor’s
intent. Whether this should be within the instrument itself, in a side
letter, in the files of the drafting attorney, or in all three places will depend on the degree of the client’s concern.
Drafting in anticipation of later disputes is not a new phenomenon.
A well-respected trial lawyer, for example, described the steps he took
to immunize a will from later contest in a situation where such a dispute
was likely:
These steps were taken to assist in preserving the will: All discussions with the testatrix were had in the absence of the favored beneficiary, the son. After the initial conference with
the testatrix, she was requested to write me a letter in her own
handwriting, setting forth in detail the disposition she wished
to make of her estate and the reasons that motivated her desire
to provide more favorably for her son than for her daughters.
Upon receipt of this letter, a draft of the will was prepared and
forwarded to her under a covering letter in which she was required to give close and careful consideration to the inequality
of the disposition as between her children and the reasons sup130 Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Letter of Wishes: Can We Influence Discretion in
Discretionary Trusts?, 35 ACTEC J. 38, 44 (2009).
131 There can be tension between flexible powers intentionally drafted into the instrument as a hedge against an unforeseeable future and general statements of settlor
intent meant as non-binding guidance. A very public dispute illustrating this tension involved Leona Helmsly’s charitable trust. See Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor
Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and Doing the Right Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
977, 1014 (2010). The trust itself permitted the trustees broad discretion to make charitable gifts. Ms. Helmsly’s “mission statement”, on the other hand, set her priorities to
assisting indigent people and, of course, dogs. The Surrogate’s Court for New York
County upheld the broad powers clause but not the narrow mission statement. See id. at
1014-15. Given Ms. Helmsly’s known love for dogs, one questions whether she would
have approved of the result.
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porting such action. She was requested again to transmit her
final decision in her own handwriting. This was done, and
thereupon the will was placed in final form. Four persons were
then selected in whose presence this will was to be reviewed,
explained, discussed and executed. Two of those were to be
used as attesting witnesses in keeping with the legal requirements of the laws of our state. The other two were not to sign
as attesting witnesses and would be used only in the event of a
contest. These four persons were carefully selected as to age
and other qualifications as witnesses. Upon completion of the
execution, each witness recorded the discussions that took
place, and particularly the statements of the testatrix, for future reference in the event of a contest. When the testatrix
died, the daughters were disappointed – one was embittered,
and there was talk of a contest. She employed a reliable attorney, and in the course of his investigation, there was revealed
to him a part of the somewhat elaborate steps that had been
taken to discourage the filing of a contest. The daughter’s attorney advised against a contest, and the will was probated.132
Elaborate or unusual, precautions could, in themselves, raise issues.
Presumably no drafting attorney would use the elaborate procedure set
out by Mr. Jaworski in every case. Why did the lawyer believe unusual
steps were required in one particular case?
A best practice would be to memorialize settlor intent in sufficient
detail to be clear to the trustees and to do so in a way that will be admissible if a contest arises. In those jurisdictions continuing to treat testamentary trusts and inter vivos trusts differently, the drafting attorney
should consider using an inter vivos trust to heighten the possibility of
the voice of the settlor being heard.

132 See Leon Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 87, 92 (1958) (offering
practical advice on minimizing potential will contests). James R. Walker, Esq. of Denver,
Colorado directed the authors to this article.
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APPENDIX
A SUMMARY OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE OF SETTLOR INTENT*
Alabama
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See ALA. R. EVID. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules.”); id. (Advisory Comm. Notes) (“This rule supersedes any inconsistent statutory grounds of incompetency. Chief among these is Alabama’s
Dead Man’s Statute. Ala. Code 1976, § 12-21-163. Superseding the Dead
Man’s Statute means that survivors will be allowed to testify, if their testimony otherwise complies with the rules of evidence, and that the unavailability of the deceased person will be merely a factor for the jury to consider
in determining the weight to give the survivor’s testimony. See Beddingfield
v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A., 440 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Ala. 1983) (recognizing the significant body of scholarly criticism of the Dead Man’s Statute)”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See ALA. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Azar v. Azar, 80 So.2d 277, 280 (Ala. 1955)
(“We have shown that the provisions of the will are plain, explicit and
unambiguous. Under such circumstances there is no room for construction
through the aid of extrinsic evidence. Parol evidence is never admissible to
obtain a construction of a will which is not warranted by or will defeat its
express terms. We must take the terms which the testator used in the will
and parol evidence is never admissible to show terms the testator intended
to use and did not use.”). In Alabama, extrinsic evidence is not admissible
in the case of a patent ambiguity but is, however, admissible where a latent
ambiguity exists. See McCollum v. Atkins, 912 So.2d 1146, 1148 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005). Note that ALA. CODE § 19-3B-415 (2007) abolishes the plain
meaning rule for testamentary trusts.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-415 (2007) (“The
court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the
terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were affected
by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”); id.,
Ala. cmt. (“This provision is a change in the common law of Alabama,
which provided that the terms of a trust could only be reformed in cases
where the terms were ambiguous, regardless of the settlor’s intent.”).
Alaska
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See ALASKA R. EVID. 601.
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See ALASKA R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Vukmir v. Vukmir, 74 P.3d 918, 920
(Alaska 2003) (noting that courts generally rule extrinsic evidence inadmissible when testator intent is clear on the face of the will).

* This summary was greatly improved by comments from ACTEC Fellows who are
members of the State Laws Committee, for which the authors are deeply appreciative.
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Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): While Alaska still recognizes the plain meaning rule as applied to wills, it has departed from the plain meaning rule in
other areas of law; however, no cases deal with an inter vivos trust. See
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. O’Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 771 (Alaska 1982)
(departing from the plain meaning rule in contract interpretation to admit
extrinsic evidence of whether or not an ambiguity in the contract terms
exists); cf. Estate of Smith v. Spinelli, 216 P.3d 524, 530 (Alaska 2009) (noting that a deed is only open to one reasonable interpretation, the court
need not go further).
Arizona
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Limitation. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2251 (2003); Troutman v. Valley National Bank, 826 P.2d 810,
812 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the application of the dead man’s
statute is within the discretion of the trial court).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See ARIZ. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Pouser, 975 P.2d 704, 708-09
(Ariz. 1999) (allowing extrinsic evidence to be admitted only where the will
contained a latent ambiguity). Note that ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1410415 (2013) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See
id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10415
(2013) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Arkansas
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See ARK. R. EVID. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules.”); Davis v. Hare, 561 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ark. 1978) (noting that the
dead man’s statute was repealed by the adoption of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See ARK. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Carmody v. Betts, 289 S.W.3d 174, 178
(Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that extrinsic evidence may only be considered if the terms of the will are ambiguous). Note that ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 28-73-415 (West 2014) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary
trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts). See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-415 (“A
court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the
terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were affected
by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
California
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Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1261 (West
1995); id. (Law Revision Comm’n Comments). (“[T]he dead man statute is
not continued in the Evidence Code. Under the Evidence Code, the positions of the parties are balanced by throwing more light, not less, on the
actual facts. Repeal of the dead man statute permits the claimant to testify
without restriction. To balance this advantage, section 1261 permits hearsay evidence of the decedent’s statements to be admitted. Certain safeguards – i.e., personal knowledge, recent perception, and circumstantial
evidence of trustworthiness – are included in the section to provide some
protection for the party against whom the statements are offered, for he has
no opportunity to test the hearsay by cross-examination.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1250-51 (West
1995); id. § 1250, Assembly Comm. on Judiciary cmt. (“[I]n Estate of
Anderson, 185 Cal. 700, 198 Pac. 407 (1921), a testatrix, after the execution
of a will, declared, in effect, that the will had been made at an aunt’s
request; this statement was held to be inadmissible hearsay ‘because it was
merely a declaration as to a past event and was not indicative of the condition of mind of the testatrix at the time she made it.’ (citing Ellis v. Stephens, 198 P. 403, 415 (1921)”); Whitlow v. Durst, 127 P.2d 530, 530 (Cal.
1942) (“When intent is a material element of a disputed fact, declarations of
a decedent made after as well as before an alleged act that indicate the
intent with which he performed the act are admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule, and it is immaterial that such declarations are
self-serving.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111.5 (West 2009)
(“Extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether a document constitutes a will . . . or to determine the meaning of a will or portion of a will if
the meaning is unclear.”); In re Estate of Flint, 102 Cal. Rptr. 345, 351 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972) (“Extrinsic evidence is admissible not only to resolve a
latent ambiguity in a will, but also to show that a latent ambiguity exists.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Safai v. Safai, 78 Cal. Rptr.3d 759, 767-68
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“In ascertaining the trustor’s intent, we look first to
the terms of the trust, though extrinsic evidence is admissible to ascertain
the meaning of the trust and the intent of the trustor.”).
Colorado
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Limitation. See COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-90-102 (West 2014) (disqualifying parties and persons in interest
with parties from testifying as to oral statements of the decedent, unless
such statements were corroborated by material evidence of a trustworthy
nature). For a definition of “corroborated by material evidence,” see 2013
Colo. Sess. Laws 767.
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See COLO. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-806 (West
2011) (“The court may reform the terms of a governing instrument, even if
unambiguous, to conform the terms to the transferor’s intention if it is
proved by clear and convincing evidence that the transferor’s intent and the
terms of the governing instrument were affected by a mistake of fact or law,
whether in expression or inducement.”); see also id. § 15-11-807.
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Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-806
(“The court may reform the terms of a governing instrument, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the transferor’s intention if it is proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the transferor’s intent and the terms of
the governing instrument were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether
in expression or inducement.”) see also id. § 15-11-807.
Connecticut
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52145 (West 2012). Note that CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-172 (West 2013)
allows what Connecticut courts have called the “dead man’s statute,” which
is an exception to hearsay that permits the admission into evidence of declarations, testimony and memorandums of a decedent. See, e.g., Dinan v.
Marchand, 903 A.2d 201, 211-212 (Conn. 2006).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See CONN. CODE
(2014).

OF

EVID. §§ 8-3; 8-6

Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See McFarland v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 337
A.2d 1, 6 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973); RALPH H. FOLSOM, PROBATE LITIG. IN
CONN. § 6:9 (2d ed. 2014) (“Extrinsic evidence is generally not admissible
to vary, contradict, or add to the terms of a Will, Codicil, or trust instrument, or to show an intention that is not found in the words used. There
must be a latent ambiguity in the document to justify admission of extrinsic
or parol evidence.”). But see Erickson v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92, 98 (Conn.
1998) (admitting extrinsic evidence in order to clarify a scrivener’s error
where the will contained no latent ambiguity).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Palozie v. Palozie, 927 A.2d 903, 911
(Conn. 2007) (“If, however, the trust instrument ‘is an incomplete expression of the settlor’s intention or if the meaning of the writing is ambiguous
or otherwise uncertain, evidence of the circumstances and other indications
of the transferor’s intent are admissible to complete the terms of the writing
or to clarify or ascertain its meaning . . . .’ ” (citation omitted)).
Delaware
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See DEL. R. EVID. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See DEL. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Bird v. Wilmington Society of Fine Arts, 43
A.2d 476, 484 (Del. 1945) (“Courts may, and usually do, admit certain
extrinsic testimony to ascertain if any ambiguity exists in the language of
the Will, and to determine that ambiguity.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Otto v. Gore, 45 A.3d 120, 136 (Del. 2012)
(“Where a provision of the trust instrument is clear and unambiguous, the
court will not consider extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the ordinary
meaning of the provision.”). However, the Otto court also noted that
extrinsic evidence may be admissible to determine whether or not a trust
has been formed. See id. at 131; accord Wilmington Trust Co. v. Annan, 531
A.2d 1209, 1213 (Del. Ch. 1987).
Florida
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Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.601 (West
2011) (“Every person is competent to be a witness, except as otherwise provided by statute.”); id. (Law Revision Council Note – 1976) (“This section,
which is substantially qualified by other provisions in this Act, makes it
clear that grounds for disqualification of a witness must be based upon statute. Included among the grounds abolished by this Act are religious belief,
conviction of a crime, and connection with litigation as a party or interested
person or being the spouse of a party or interested person.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(b)(1) (West
2013); id. (Law Revision Council Note – 1976) (“Existing Florida law is
apparently in accord with the rule admitting statements of memory or belief
relating to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of a declarant’s will to prove the fact remembered or believed. In Marshall v. Hewett,
156 Fla. 645, 24 So.2d 1 (1945), the testimony of the draftsman of a will
concerning the verbal instructions given him by the testator was admissible
for the purpose of making clear the desires and intent of the testator. See
CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1260”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.615 (West 2010)
(Permitting a court to reform a will, even if it appears “unambiguous”, to
conform to testator intent). But see In re Riggs, 643 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“When the terms of the will, are themselves, clear and
unambiguous, there is no reason to engage in construction.”). Extrinsic evidence is permissible in cases of both patent and latent ambiguities. See First
Union National Bank of Florida, N.A. v. Frumkin, 659 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Perkins v. O’Donald, 82 So. 401, 404-05 (Fla. 1919).
Note that FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0415 (West 2014) abolishes the plain
meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0415 (West 2010)
(“Upon application of a settlor or any interested person, the court may
reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to
the settlor’s intent if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both
the accomplishment of the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.
In determining the settlor’s original intent, the court may consider evidence
relevant to the settlor’s intent even though the evidence contradicts an
apparent plain meaning of the trust instrument.”).
Georgia
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-601
(2013) (“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every person is competent to be a witness.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(3) (2013).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-56 (2011) (Extrinsic evidence is admissible if there are either patent or latent ambiguities.).
Contra Chattowah Open Land Trust, Inc. v. Jones, 636 S.E.2d 523, 526 (Ga.
2006) (explaining that when a will is plain and unambiguous, no outside
evidence is admissible). Note that GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-60(a) (2011)
abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
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Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-60(a) (2013)
(“If it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that the trust provisions
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement, the court may reform the trust provisions, even if unambiguous, to
conform the provisions to the settlor’s intention.”).
Hawaii
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See HAW. R. EVID. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules.”); id. editor’s notes (“The rule embodies the intent expressed in the
Advisory Committee’s Note to Fed. R. Evid. 601 to abolish ‘religious belief,
conviction of crime, and connection with the litigation as a party or interested person or spouse of a party or interested person’ as bases for disqualification of a witness. Proper grounds for witness disqualification are set
forth in Rules 602 and 603.1.”); Hew v. Aruda, 462 P.2d 476, 479 (Haw.
1969) (“Although not adopted in Hawaii, the so-called ‘dead man’s statute’
as it operated in other jurisdictions totally disqualified as a witness the survivor of a transaction with a decedent when the survivor’s testimony was
offered against the decedent’s estate.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See HAW. R. EVID. 803(b)(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): There is no common law distinction in Hawaii
between patent and latent ambiguities. See In re Ikuta’s Estate, 639 P.2d
400, 402 (Haw. 1981).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Graham v. Washington University, 569
P.2d 896, 900 (Haw. 1977) (concluding that the trial court was incorrect to
exclude extrinsic evidence because the trust language was indeed ambiguous); In re Dowsett’s Estate, 38 Haw. 407, 409-410 (1949). (“While it is true
as contended by the remainderman that this intent must be gathered if possible from the trust instrument itself, nevertheless it is equally true that
extrinsic evidence with respect to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the trust and the settlor’s conception of any ambiguous words,
employed by him in the trust instrument, may be received and considered
for the purpose of aiding the court in construing the instrument to determine his intent.”).
Idaho
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Limitation. See IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 9-202 (2010) (barring testimony of interested parties “to any communication or agreement, not in writing, occurring before the death of such
deceased person”); IDAHO. R. EVID. 601(b) (“Claim Against Estate. Parties
or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose
behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or administrator, upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person as
to any communication or agreement, not in writing, occurring before the
death of such deceased person.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See IDAHO. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Hintze v. Black, 873 P.2d 909, 912 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1994) (“If the language of the will is clear and unambiguous, this
intent is derived from the will itself. However, if the meaning of a term is
ambiguous, the court can look to extrinsic evidence to determine intent.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See In re Trust Established by Turner, 782
P.2d 36, 38 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (applying the plain meaning rule to trusts
as it has long been applied to wills).

38

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:1

Illinois
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-201
(West 2014); Brown, Udell & Pomerantz Ltd. v. Ryan, 861 N.E.2d 258, 26263 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Gunn v. Sobucki, 837 N.E.2d 865, 870-71 (Ill. 2005).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See ILL. R. EVID. 803(3)(A). PLAIN
MEANING RULE (WILLS): See Trabue v. Gillham, 97 N.E.2d 341, 342-43 (Ill.
1951) (allowing extrinsic evidence in both instances of latent and patent
ambiguities); 18 ROBERT S. HUNTER, ILL. PRAC., EST. PLAN. & ADMIN.
§ 145:3 (4th ed. 2007) (“Prior to 1962, the rule in Illinois was that extrinsic
evidence, while admissible to clarify a latent ambiguity, could not be admitted to clarify a patent ambiguity. That rule was changed, making extrinsic
evidence admissible to aid in determining the testator’s intent whether the
ambiguity was latent or patent. Weir v. Leafgreen, 186 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ill.
1962).”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Trabue v. Gillham, 97 N.E.2d 341, 342-43
(Ill. 1951) (allowing extrinsic evidence in both instances of latent and patent
ambiguities); 18 ROBERT S. HUNTER, ILL. PRAC., EST. PLAN. & ADMIN.
§ 143:3 (4th ed. 2007) (“Prior to 1962, the rule in Illinois was that extrinsic
evidence, while admissible to clarify a latent ambiguity, could not be admitted to clarify a patent ambiguity. That rule was changed, making extrinsic
evidence admissible to aid in determining the testator’s intent whether the
ambiguity was latent or patent. Weir v. Leafgreen, 186 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ill.
1962).”).”
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Koulogeorge v. Campbell, 983 N.E.2d
1066, 1074 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“The settlor’s intent is to be determined
solely by reference to the plain language of the trust itself and extrinsic
evidence may be admitted to aid interpretation only if the document is
ambiguous, and the settlor’s intent cannot be ascertained.”) (citations omitted); Stein v. Scott, 625 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Peck v. Froehlich, 853 N.E.2d 927, 932-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
Indiana
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-45-2-4 (West
2011).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See IND. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 263, 265
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996); In re Estate of Grimm, 705 N.E.2d 483, 498 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) (noting that a court will look to the four corners of a will in
determining testator intent and should enforce express terms of will if no
ambiguity exists); Stoner v. Custer, 251 N.E.2d 668, 670 (Ind. 1969) (“Where
the meaning of a will is plain the court is limited to its interpretation within
the four corners of the instrument. However, where there is an ambiguity
. . . the court is permitted to consider the circumstances surrounding the
testator at the time of execution.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See University of Southern Indiana Foundation v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 2006) (“[W]here a trust is capable
of clear and unambiguous construction, under this doctrine, the court must
give effect to the trust’s clear meaning without resort to extrinsic evidence.”); State v. Hammans, 870 N.E.2d 1071, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
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Iowa
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.3 (West
2014); id. § 622.4 (repealed 1983).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See IOWA R. EVID. 5.803.
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Bankers Trust Co. v. Allen, 135 N.W.2d
607, 610, 611 (1965) (noting that where language is unambiguous, the will’s
meaning must be determined from its language, and also noting that if a will
contains a latent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is admissible).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Dunn v. Dunn, 258 N.W. 695, 698 (1935)
(applying the plain meaning rule as used in contract law in general to trust
instruments).
Kansas
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-407 (West
2013).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (West
2013) (“Recitals in documents affecting property. Evidence of a statement
relevant to a material matter, contained in a deed of conveyance or a will or
other document purporting to affect an interest in property, offered as
tending to prove the truth of the matter stated [is admissible], if the judge
finds that (1) the matter stated would be relevant upon an issue as to an
interest in the property and (2) the dealings with the property since the
statement was made have not been inconsistent with the truth of the statement.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Mildrexter, 971 P.2d 758, 760
(Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (“If the testator’s intent can be ascertained, neither
rules of construction nor extrinsic evidence should be allowed to vary the
clear intent expressed on the face of the instrument.”). Note that KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58a-415 (West 2013) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-415 (West
2014). (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Kentucky
Dead Man’s Statute: Repealed. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412.210
(repealed 1992).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See KY. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Dils v. Richey, 431 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Ky.
1968) (“Since the will is unambiguous no construction is called for, hence
extrinsic evidence may not be introduced as an aid to construction.”); 2 KY.
PRAC. PROB., PRAC. & PROC. § 1106 (2013) (noting that while the traditional distinction is that extrinsic evidence is admissible where there is a
latent ambiguity, but not a patent ambiguity, such distinction may no longer
be appropriate).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Department of Revenue v. Kentucky Trust
Co., 313 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958) (applying the same rules of
construction for wills to the construction of trust instruments).
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Louisiana
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3721
(2006) (excluding oral testimony about a decedent’s debts unless action is
brought within one year of death).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 803(3)
(2014).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1611(A) (2008)
(“The intent of the testator controls the interpretation of his testament. If
the language of the testament is clear, its letter is not to be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. The following rules for interpretation apply only when the testator’s intent cannot be ascertained from the
language of the testament. In applying these rules, the court may be aided
by any competent evidence.”); Pittman v. Magic City Memorial Co., 985
So.2d 156, 159 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“When a will is free from ambiguity, the
will must be carried out according to its written terms, without reference to
information outside the will.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Thomas v. Kneipp, 986 So.2d 175, 186
(La. Ct. App. 2008) (“Parol or extrinsic evidence may be admitted to aid in
construing a trust instrument only if the instrument is ambiguous or uncertain, and only to explain, and not to contradict, the instrument.”) (citing
Lelong v. Succession of Lelong, 164 So.2d 671, 674 (La. Ct. App. 1964)).
Maine
Dead Man’s Statute: Repealed. See ME. REV. STAT. Ann. tit. 16, § 1
(repealed 1977); Kirk v. Marquis, 391 A.2d 335, 336 (Me. 1978) (noting that
the repeal of the dead man’s statute, a statement that the decedent would
“take care of” the claimant is admissible as a state of mind exception to the
hearsay rule).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See ME. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Silsby, 914 A.2d 703, 706
(Me. 2006) (recognizing that the court must first look to the four corners of
the will, and, if the testator’s intent is ambiguous, the court may then consider extrinsic evidence). Note that ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 415
(2012) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 415
(2012) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Maryland
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 9-116 (West 2014); Ebert v. Ritchey, 458 A.2d 891, 895 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1983); Mason v. Poulson, 40 Md. 355, 362 (Md. 1874).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See MD. RULE 5-803(b)(3).
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Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See First National Bank of Maryland v. White,
211 A.2d 328, 333 (Md. 1965) (“It is a fundamental principle that where the
language of a will is plain and unambiguous, no extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that the testator’s intention was different from that which the
will discloses.”). Maryland allows extrinsic evidence if a will contains a
latent ambiguity. See Monmonier v. Monmonier, 266 A.2d 17, 19 (Md.
1970). As discussed below, the Maryland Trust Act now permits extrinsic
evidence to show settlor intent in testamentary trusts.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Jahnigen v. Smith, 795 A.2d 234, 240 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children v. Maryland
National Bank, 312 A.2d 546, 553-54 (Md. 1973); Fasman v. Pattashnick, 51
A.2d 664, 666 (Md. 1947) (admitting parol evidence to establish the existence of constructive trusts). Effective January 1, 2015, the Maryland Trust
Act adopts UTC section 415 to permit reformation to conform the terms of
a trust, even if unambiguous, to reflect settlor intent. MD. CODE ANN., EST.
& TRUSTS § 14.5-413 (West 2015). This provision applies to testamentary
and inter vivos trusts.
Massachusetts
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233,
§ 65 (West 2014) (“a declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay . . . if the court finds that it was made in good
faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See MA. R. EVID. § 803(3)(B)(iii).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Putnam v. Putnam, 316 N.E.2d 729, 734
(Mass. 1974) (“If a will is not ambiguous, extrinsic evidence to explain its
terms is inadmissible . . . . If, however, there is an ambiguity in a will, such
as a conflict of terms, extrinsic evidence may be resorted to in order to
show the circumstances known to the testator under which he viewed that
ambiguous language.”). Extrinsic evidence will be admissible where either
a patent or latent ambiguity exists. See Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d
739, 742 (Mass. 2000) (noting that the will in issue was not ambiguous, as it
contained neither patent nor latent ambiguities). Note that MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 203E, § 415 (West 2014) abolishes the plain meaning rule
for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 203E, § 415
(West 2014) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear
and convincing evidence that the settlor’s intent or the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Michigan
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Limitation. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2166 (West 2014) (permitting testimony from an interested witness, if such testimony is corroborated by some other material evidence).
Although the statute remains intact, courts have held that the general powers of Rule 601 trump the dead man’s statute. See Turbyfill v. International
Harvester Co., 486 F.Supp. 232, 236 (E.D. Mich. 1980); James v. Dixon, 291
N.W.2d 106, 108 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See MICH. R. EVID. 803(3).
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Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Raymond, 761 N.W.2d 1, 4
(Mich. 2009) (“If there is no ambiguity, the Court is to enforce the will as
written. However, if the intent of the testator cannot be gleaned solely by
reference to the will because there is an ambiguity, the Court may discern
the intent of the testator through extrinsic sources.”) (footnotes omitted).
Note that MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN., § 700.7415 (West 2014) abolishes the
plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 700.7415
(“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Minnesota
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See MINN. R. EVID. 601 (“Except as
provided by these rules, the competency of a witness to give testimony shall
be determined in accordance with law.”). The earlier dead man’s statute
was repealed, apparently in response to a suggestion from the Court of
Appeals. See generally In re Lea’s Estate, 222 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.04 (Repealed 1987).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See MINN. R. EVID. 803(3); see id.
(Comm. Comment – 1989) (“The rule does not permit evidence of a declarant’s present state of mind to be admitted to establish the declarant’s previous actions, unless dealing with the execution, revocation, identification, or
terms of declarant’s will. Cf. Troseth v. Troseth, 224 Minn. 35, 28 N.W.2d 65
(1947). (Present state of mind used to prove previous intent in effectuating
gift.)”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Trusts A & B of Devine, 672 N.W.2d
912, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“Extrinsic evidence of the meaning of a
will is admissible only when the text of the will is ambiguous.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See In re Stisser Trust, 818 N.W.2d 495, 502
(Minn. 2012) (“When the trust agreement is unambiguous, we will ascertain
the grantor’s intent from the language of the agreement, without resort to
extrinsic evidence.”).
Mississippi
Dead Man’s Statute: Repealed. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-7 (repealed
1991).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See MISS. R. EVID. 803(3); id. cmt. 3.
(“One exemption from the exclusion is for statements of memory or belief
which relate to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of a
declarant’s will. There is no particular logical reason for this. Rather, the
basis for allowing such statements is founded on necessity and expediency.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): Estate of Blount v. Papps, 611 So.2d 862, 866
(Miss. 1992) (“In determining the testator’s intent, in the absence of ambiguity, this Court is limited to the ‘four corners’ of the will itself.”). Note
that MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-8-415 (West 2014) abolishes the plain meaning
rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
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Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-8-415 (“The
court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the
terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that what the settlor’s intention was and that the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Missouri
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 491.010 (West
2011); See Estate of Oden v. Oden, 905 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that the 1985 amendment to the statute abandoned the historic
dead man’s statute, which “operated to disable interested witnesses from
testifying about transactions with deceased persons”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See Ryterski v. Wilson, 740 S.W.2d 374
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing past cases of will contests where declarations of decedent held to be admissible under the “state of mind” hearsay
exception).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Krechter v. Grofe, 66 S.W. 358, 359 (Mo.
1901); Naylor v. Koeppe, 686 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In the
case of a latent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is admissible, including declarations made by the testator of his intent are inadmissible. In the case of a
patent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is admissible but shall not include declarations made by the testator of his intent. See Schupbach v. Schupbach,
760 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). Note that MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 456.4-415 (West 2007) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary
trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See MO. ANN. STAT. §456.4-415 (“The court
may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms
to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that
both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Montana
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See MONT. R. EVID. 601; id. cmt. a.
(“The ground of incompetency found in section 93-701-3, R.C.M. 1947
[superseded], not covered by these rules is commonly known as the Dead
Man’s Statute. Therefore, this rule has the effect of abolishing the Dead
Man’s Statute in Montana.” (brackets in original)).
Hearsay Exception: Not Recognized. See MONT. R. EVID. 803(3); id. cmt.
3. (“This exception is identical to Federal and Uniform Rules (1974) Rule
803(3) except the phrase ‘unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of the declarant’s will,’ found at the end of the
exception in those rules, is deleted from the exception.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Lindgren, 885 P.2d 1280,
1282 (Mont. 1994) (“If the wording of the will is clear and unambiguous,
the court shall not consider extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will”). Note that MON. CODE ANN. §72-38415 (West 2013) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts.
See id.
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Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See MON. CODE ANN. §72-38-415 (West
2013) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence what the settlor’s intention was and that the terms of the
trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or
inducement.”).
Nebraska
Dead Man’s Statute: Repealed. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1202
(repealed 1975).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-803(2)
(LexisNexis 2013).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): Extrinsic evidence permitted only in the
instance of a latent ambiguity. See In re Estate of Mousel, 715 N.W.2d 490,
494 (Neb. 2006) (“Parol evidence is inadmissible to determine the intent of
a testator as expressed in his or her will, unless there is a latent ambiguity
therein which makes his or her intention obscure or uncertain.”). Note that
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-3841 (LexisNexis 2010) abolishes the plain
meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-3841 (LexisNexis 2010) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if
unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved
by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms
of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression
or inducement.”).
Nevada
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.075
(West 2004).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.105(2)
(West 2008).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Jones, 296 P.2d 295, 296
(Nev. 1956) (“The question before us is not what the testatrix actually
intended or what she meant to write. Rather it is confined to a determination of the meaning of the words used by her.”). The Court in Jones noted
that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to clarify a patent ambiguity. To the
extent that two provisions contradict one another, they both must fail. Id.
at 297. See also Frei v. Goodsell, 305 P.3d 70, 73-74 (Nev. 2013).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See In re Estate of Walter, 343 P.2d 572, 574
(Nev. 1959) (regarding testamentary trusts). The Walters’ case notes that
the plain meaning rule applies when dealing with express provisions of a
will; however, in the case where there is no express provision, but the failure to make a provision, “ ‘[T]he intention of the grantor need not have
been expressed by specific words, but may be derived from the entire
instrument as a whole, from its general scheme, or from informal language
used, by necessary implication, i.e., implication not based on conjecture, but
so strong that a contrary intention cannot be supposed to have existed in his
mind.’ ” Id. at 574 (quoting Brock v. Hall, 198 P.2d 69, 72 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1948), aff’d, 206 P.2d 360.).
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New Hampshire
Dead Man’s Statute: Repealed. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:25
(repealed 1994). In the limited circumstances of endorsees or assignees of
negotiable paper, however, a restriction remains. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 516:26 (2013).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See N.H. R. EVID. 803(3); id., Reporter’s
Notes (“Rule 803(3) does, however, allow statements of ‘then existing state
of mind’ to show previous conduct which ‘relates to the execution, application, identification, or terms of declarant’s will.’ RSA 516:25 and the case
law under it allow such statements by deceased persons in other types of
actions in addition to probate proceedings. See generally, In re Estate of
Sayewich, 120 N.H. 237, 413 A.2d 581 (1980).”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Sayewich, 413 A.2d 581, 584
(N.H. 1980) (“Extrinsic evidence may be received, however, to supplement
or sustain the terms of the will, and to ascertain the testator’s intent where
the language used is ambiguous.”). New Hampshire requires a latent ambiguity in order for extrinsic evidence to be admissible. Brown v. Brown, 43
N.H. 17, 17 (1861) (“Where there is no latent ambiguity in a devise, parol
evidence of the intention of the testator is inadmissible.”). Note that N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-415 (2013) abolishes the plain meaning rule for
testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-415
(2013) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
New Jersey
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Limitation. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§2A:81-2 (West 2014) (limiting interested persons’ testimony to instances
where there is clear and convincing proof).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See N.J. R. EVID. 803(c)(3); id. cmt. c. 3.
(“Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. Rule 803(c)(3)
follows Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) almost verbatim, adding the good faith requirement contained in N.J.Evid.R. 63(12). This rule replaces paragraph (a) of
N.J.Evid.R. 63(12), first adding the term ‘physical condition’ and, consistent
with New Jersey law, the provision respecting declarant’s will. See Engle v.
Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 293-294 (1977); Wilson v. Flowers, 58 N.J. 250, 261-264
(1971); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561 (1962); N.J.S.A. 3B:333 (permitting proof of the testator’s intent by way of extrinsic “relevant
circumstances.”). The phrase “relevant circumstances” has been construed
as including testator’s statements of intent. See, e.g., Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J.
at 291,
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Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Payne, 895 A.2d 428, 434
(N.J. 2006) (“The trial court is not ‘limited simply to searching out the probable meaning intended by the words and phrases in the will.’ Engle v. Siegel,
74 N.J. 287, 291, 377 A.2d 892 (1977). Extrinsic evidence may ‘furnish [ ]
information regarding the circumstances surrounding the testator [and]
should be admitted to aid in ascertaining [the testator’s] probable intent
under the will.’ Wilson v. Flowers, 58 N.J. 250, 260, 277 A.2d 199 (1971). To
be sure, the testator’s own expressions of his or her intent are highly relevant. Id. at 262-63, 277 A.2d 199. Once the evidence establishes the probable intent of the testator, ‘the court may not refuse to effectuate that intent
by indulging in a merely literal reading of the instrument.’ Id. at 260, 277
A.2d 199.” (brackets in original)).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See In re Voorhes’ Trust, 225 A.2d 710, 713714 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1967) (“The current view of probable intent
requires that a trust or will be construed in a manner consonant with what
the donor would have done had she envisioned the unexpected problem.
This entails viewing the document as a whole in order to see if it evinces a
‘dominant plan and purpose’ when read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, ascribing to the settlor those impulses ‘common to human
nature’ and considering the competent extrinsic evidence as to the settlor’s
intent.”).
New Mexico
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See N.M. R. EVID §11-601 (“Every
person is competent to be a witness unless these rules provide otherwise.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See N.M. R. EVID §11-803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Frietze, 966 P.2d 183, 185
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (“If a will is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence may not
be accepted to determine the intent of the testator. Whether a will is
ambiguous is a question of law.”). Note that N.M. STAT. ANN. §46A-4-415
(West’s 2013) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-4-415 (West
2013) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
New York
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Exceptions. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4519
(McKinney 2014) (excepting: (1) where the executor, survivor, etc. is testifying on his own behalf; (2) where testimony of deceased is offered regarding the same communication or transaction; (3) where the party in interest
is a stockholder or officer or an interested banking corporation; (4) where
the testimony relates to costs being awarded to or against the interested
party; and (5) where the testimony regards facts of a vehicle accident where
the proceeding, hearing, defense or cause of action involves a claim of negligence).
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Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See In re Estate of Rosasco, No. 4050/
2006, 2011 WL 1467632 at *5 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. April 5, 2011) (“Decedent’s
declarations to [great-niece] that: (1) if she were to contact her lawyer
about making a new will, proponent would ‘hurt me,’ (2) if [great-niece]
were to contact the lawyer on decedent’s behalf, proponent’s ‘going to hurt
you,’ and (3) regardless of the terms of her will, proponent would ‘find a
way to steal’ the assets of her estate, are not considered for their truth or
falsity. Rather, these statements fall within the state of mind exception to
the hearsay rule (see PRINCE ON EVIDENCE § 8–106).”). However, New
York courts have modified the hearsay exception in some instances.
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Scale, 830 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620
(N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (“the best indicator of testator’s intent is found in
the clear and unambiguous language of the will itself and, thus, where no
ambiguity exists, ‘[e]xtrinsic evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a
will.’ ”); In re Fabbri, 140 N.E. 2d 269, 273-74, 2 N.Y. 2d 236, 243-4 (N.Y.
1957) (“The law takes into consideration the relative inadequacy of words
as a vehicle for communicating intent and seeks the purpose of the testator
by means of a more thorough and realistic approach. . . . [B]y reading the
language in light of the rest of the instrument, the circumstances surrounding its formulation and the inferences supplied by common experience (in
this case the presumption against intestacy), the court seeks to minimize the
possibility that testator’s true purpose will be frustrated by an unwarranted
dependence on an ill-chosen word or phrase.”); see also 39 N.Y. JUR.2d
Decedents’ Estates § 678 (2014).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San
Diego Yacht Club, 557 N.E.2d 87, 93 (N.Y. 1990) (“It is only where the
court determines the words of the trust instrument to be ambiguous that it
may properly resort to extrinsic evidence.”).
North Carolina
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See N.C. R. EVID. 601(c).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See N.C. R. EVID. 803(3); id. cmt. 3. (“In
North Carolina, when the issue is one of undue influence or fraud with
respect to the execution of a will, the declarations of a testator are admitted
only as corroborative evidence and are not alone sufficient to establish the
previous conduct of another person by means of which the alleged fraud
was perpetrated or the undue influence exerted. BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 163, at 647-48. Exception (3) would change this result
and permit such declarations to be admitted as substantive proof.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 91
S.E.2d 246, 250 (N.C. 1956) (recognizing the “four corners” of the will must
be first looked to in understanding testator intent). North Carolina deems
extrinsic evidence admissible in the case of latent ambiguities, but generally
not in the case patent ambiguities. Id. Some courts have later allowed
extrinsic evidence in the case of patent ambiguities if such evidence is limited to the circumstances attendant when the will was made. See, e.g., Wooten v. Hobbs, 86 S.E. 811, 813 (N.C. 1915). Note that N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 36C-4-415 (2013) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts.
See id.
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Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-4-415 (2013)
(“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
North Dakota
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See N.D. R. EVID. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules.”); id. (Explanatory Note) (“Neither this rule nor any of the rules of
this code contain a ‘Dead Man’s’ statute. This represents a departure from
former North Dakota law. The former ‘Dead Man’s’ statute, § 31-01-03,
NDCC, and by reference § 31-01-04 and § 31-01-05, NDCC, are superseded
by adoption of these rules.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See N.D. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 871
(N.D. 1992) (“Unless a duly executed will is ambiguous, the testamentary
intent is derived from the will itself, not from extrinsic evidence.”). Extrinsic evidence can be allowed in if either a patent or latent ambiguity exists.
See In re Kahoutek’s Estate, 166 N.W. 816, 818 (N.D. 1918) (“We are satisfied that the will does not permit of the construction contended for by
respondents. There is, in fact, no imperfect description in the will, nor is
there either a patent or a latent ambiguity.”). Note that N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 59-12-15 (2010) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts.
See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-15 (2010)
(“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Ohio
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See OHIO EVID. R. 601. Rule 601
has been held to abrogate Ohio’s Dead Man’s Statute. See Johnson v.
Porter, 471 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ohio 1984).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See OHIO EVID. R. 803(3); id. (Staff
Notes) (“Where the statement is by a testator concerning the execution,
revocation, identification or terms of a will, such statement though constituting a belief about a past event is admissible. The declaration in this specific instance is highly trustworthy since it relates so closely to the testatordeclarant’s affairs, and the general prohibition against statements of belief
about past events is unnecessary.”).

Spring 2014]

EVIDENCE OF SETTLOR INTENT

49

Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Belardo v. Belardo, 930 N.E. 2d 862, 867
(Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (Noting that testator intent must be gathered from
the words contained in the will, and only when the language is unclear may
extrinsic evidence be considered); Oliver v. Bank One, Dayton N.A., 573
N.E.2d 55, 58 (Ohio 1991) (“The court may consider extrinsic evidence to
determine the testator’s intention only when the language used in the will
creates doubt as to the meaning of the will.”). Note that OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5804.15 (West 2013) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5804.15 (West
2013) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if they are unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by
clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of
the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or
inducement.”); id. § 5804.11 (B) (“A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be
terminated upon consent of all of the beneficiaries if the court concludes
that continuance of the trust is not necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust. A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be modified, but
not to remove or replace the trustee, upon consent of all of the beneficiaries
if the court concludes that modification is not inconsistent with a material
purpose of the trust. A spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust may,
but is not presumed to, constitute a material purpose of the trust. In determining what constitutes a material purpose of a trust, a court may but is not
required to consider extrinsic evidence indicating a settlor’s intent at the
time the instrument was executed.”).
Oklahoma
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2601
(West 2009) (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in this Code.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803(3)
(West 2009).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Sharp, 512 P.2d 160, 165
(Okla. 1973) (concluding seemingly clear language was in fact a latent
ambiguity, and permitting certain extrinsic evidence). But see In re Estate
of Glomset, 547 P.2d 951, 953 (Okla. 1976) (“[I]f there are no uncertainties
appearing on the face of the will, extrinsic evidence is not admissible.”).
Oregon
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.310
(West 2014); id. (1981 Conference Comm. Commentary). (“Oregon Rule of
Evidence 601 states the general principle of competency of witnesses. At
common law, a person might be disqualified from testifying because of
criminal conviction, interest in the outcome, marital relationship, sex, race
or religion. For over a century these common law rules of incompetency
have been revised piecemeal by statute, so that today most of the former
grounds for excluding a witness from testifying have been converted into
mere grounds for impeachment of credibility. Oregon Rule of Evidence
601 confirms this trend. Rule 601—and Rules 602 to 606-1 which it incorporates by reference—effectively remove all the old common law disqualifications.” (citation omitted)).
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Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(3) (West
2014); id. (1981 Conference Comm. Commentary) (“The carving out, from
the exclusion for statements of memory or belief, of statements relating to
the declarant’s will represents an ad hoc judgment appealing to expediency
rather than logic. There is ample recognition in statute and case law of the
need for and practical value of this kind of evidence.” (citations omitted)).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Kidder v. Olsen, 31 P.3d 1139 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001) (“while the general rule is that a will speaks for itself . . . extrinsic evidence is admissible to reveal a latent ambiguity in the words of the
testator and a court will construe the will in light of the extrinsic evidence.”)
(internal quotations omitted). Note that OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.220
(West 2014) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.220 (West
2014) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if the person requesting reformation proves by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s
intent and the terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law,
whether in expression or inducement.”).
Pennsylvania
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5930
(West 2013); S. Michael Yeager, The Pennsylvania Dead Man’s Statute, 18
WIDENER L. REV. 53, 54 (2012) (“The Dead Man’s Statute in Pennsylvania
consists of a single sentence containing more than three hundred words,
constructed as a triple negative, delineating when a surviving or remaining
party to a ‘thing or contract in action’ may or may not testify, and is a part
of the substantive law of the Commonwealth. It ‘applies to civil proceedings
before any tribunal in the Commonwealth.’ ”) (quoting 42 PA. CON. STAT.
ANN. § 5930 (West 2000)). There are, however, several restricted situations
as well. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5933 (West 2013); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2209 (West 2014).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See PA. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7740.5 (West
2014) (“The court may reform a trust instrument, even if unambiguous, to
conform to the settlor’s probable intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that the settlor’s intent as expressed in the trust instrument was affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or
inducement.”). The Pennsylvania Code defines a trust instrument to
include a will. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7703 (West 2014).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for testamentary
and inter vivos trusts. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7740.5 (“The court
may reform a trust instrument, even if unambiguous, to conform to the settlor’s probable intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the settlor’s intent as expressed in the trust instrument was affected by
a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Rhode Island
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-12 (2012)
(“No person shall be disqualified from testifying in any civil action or proceeding by reason of his or her being interested therein or being a party
thereto.”).
Hearsay Exception: See R.I. R. Evid. 803(3).
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Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Lazarus v. Sherman, 10 A.3d 456, 462 (R.I.
2011) (noting that the consideration of extrinsic evidence is improper if the
testator’s intent can be determined from the four corners of the will).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See id. (applying the same rules of construction for wills to the construction of trusts). See also Steinhof v. Murphy, 991
A.2d 1028, 1033-34 (R.I. 2010) (involving a nontestamentary trust).
South Carolina
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (2013).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See S.C. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): Extrinsic evidence permitted in the instance of
a latent ambiguity. See Kemp v. Rawlings, 594 S.E.2d 845, 849 (S.C. 2004)
(“A will must be read in the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words
employed, unless some obvious absurdity, repugnancy, or inconsistency
with the declared intention of the testator, as abstracted from the whole
will, would follow from such construction.”); Estate of Gill v. Clemson University Foundation, 725 S.E.2d 516, 520 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). Note that S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-7-415 (2014) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-415 (2013)
(“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence what the settlor’s intention was and that the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
South Dakota
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-1
(2004) (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in chapters 19-9 to 19-18, inclusive.”); id. § 19-16-34 (“any statement of the deceased whether oral or written shall not be excluded as hearsay, provided that the trial judge shall first find as a fact that the statement
was made by decedent, and that it was in good faith and on decedent’s
personal knowledge.”).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-7.
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Seefeldt, 720 N.W.2d 647,
649 (S.D. 2006) (noting that when the testator’s intent is clear from the will
language, such intent controls).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See In re Estate of Stevenson, 605 N.W.2d 818,
821 (S.D. 2000) (applying the plain meaning rule as recognized in will construction to trust instruments); Luke v. Stevenson, 696 N.W.2d 553, 557
(S.D. 2005); In re Florence Y. Wallbaum Revocable Living Trust Agreement,
813 N.W.2d 111, 117 (S.D. 2012).
Tennessee
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-203 (2000).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See TENN. R. EVID. 803(3).
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Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Estate of Eden, 99 S.W.3d 82, 93
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing that testator’s intention must be understood from four corners of the will, unless ambiguous). Parol evidence will
be admitted in the case of latent ambiguities, but not in the cause of patent
ambiguities. See Estate of Burchfiel v. First United Methodist Church of
Sevierville, 933 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Note that TENN.
CODE ANN. § 35-15-415 (2007) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-415 (2007)
(“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Texas
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Limitation. See TEX. R. EVID.
601(b) (permitting testimony from an interested witness, yet requiring such
testimony to be corroborated).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(3); Griffin v. Robertson, 592 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. App. 1979) (ruling that the trial court properly admitted evidence related to decedent’s intent), abrogated on other
grounds by Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. 1990).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See San Antonio Area Foundation v. Lang, 35
S.W.3d 636, 339 (Tex. 2000) (“Determining a testatrix’s intent from the four
corners of a will requires a careful examination of the words used. If the
will is unambiguous, a court should not go beyond specific terms in search
of the testatrix’s intent.”); Rogers v. Ardella Veigel Inter Vivos Trust No. 2,
162 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tex. App. 2005).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Soefje v. Jones, 270 S.W.3d 617, 628 (Tex.
App. 2008) (“If the words in the trust are unambiguous, we do not go
beyond them to find the grantor’s intent.”); Eckels v. Davis, 111 S.W.3d
687, 694 (Tex. App. 2003).
Utah
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See UTAH R. EVID. 601; id. (Advisory Comm. Note) (“Rule 601 departs from the federal rule by adding two
paragraphs to treat the problem of litigation involving deceased persons.
The rule supersedes the Utah ‘Dead Man’ statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-242 (1953), which is no longer operable.”). Utah’s version of 601 generally
makes statements by a decedent admissible. For actions against a decedent’s estate, the declaration must have been made when the decedent’s
recollection was clear and not under circumstances indicating untrustworthiness. See UTAH R. EVID. 601.
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See UTAH R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540,
542 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that intent does not need be ascertained from the document alone, but also in light of the conditions and
circumstances surrounding its execution). Note that UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-7-415 (West 1993) abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary
trusts.
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Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-415 (West
1993) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Vermont
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Exceptions. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1602 (West 2013).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See VT. R. EVID. 803(3); id. (Reporter’s
Notes) (“No Vermont cases on the pragmatically grounded exception for a
testator’s statement concerning his will have been found. Trask v. Walker’s
Estate, 100 Vt. 51, 134 A. 853, 858 (1926), allowing testimony of a decedent’s statement that she had given property to her daughter and executrix,
in fact involves a declaration against interest.”).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Eckstein v. Estate of Dunn, 816 A.2d 494,
498-99 (Vt. 2002) (noting that in ascertaining intent, the court must look to
the four corners of the will and may consider extrinsic evidence when an
ambiguity exists). Note that VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 415 (West 2013)
abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 415 (West
2013) (“[The] court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous,
to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and
convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Virginia
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Limitation. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-397 (2007) (permitting testimony from an interested witness, yet
requiring such testimony to be corroborated).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See VA. R. EVID. 2:803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See Gaymon v. Gaymon, 519 S.E.2d 142, 144
(“Extrinsic evidence may be considered only if the language of the will is
ambiguous, that is, susceptible to more than one interpretation.”). Note
that VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-733 (2012) abolishes the plain meaning rule for
testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts). See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-733 (2012)
(“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Washington
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.030
(West 2014).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See WASH. R. EVID. 803(a)(3).
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Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): Extrinsic evidence permitted only in the
instance of patent ambiguities, latent ambiguities, or equivocation. See In re
Riemcke’s Estate, 497 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Wash. 1972) (“Extrinsic evidence
will not be admitted in the construction of unambiguous wills.”); In re
Estate of Bergau, 693 P.2d 703, 706 (Wash. 1985).
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): See Templeton v. Peoples National Bank of
Washington, 722 P.2d 63, 65-66 (Wash. 1986) (“ ‘Where the meaning of an
instrument evidencing a trust is unambiguous, the instrument is not one
requiring judicial construction or interpretation; if the intention may be
gathered from its language without reference to rules of construction, there
is no occasion to use such rules, and the actual intent may not be changed
by construction.’ ”) (citing 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 161, at 18-19 (1955)).
West Virginia
Dead Man’s Statute: Not Recognized. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Prinz, 743 S.E.2d 907, 918 (W. Va. 2013) (invalidating the dead man’s
statute).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See W. VA. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): Extrinsic evidence permitted only in the
instance of latent ambiguities. See Hobbs v. Brenneman, 118 S.E. 546, 549
(W. Va. 1923). Note that W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44D-4-415 (West 2014)
abolishes the plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See McClintock v. Loisseau, 8 S.E. 612, 61415 (W. Va. 1888) (allowing extrinsic evidence to establish the existence of a
resulting trust). See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44D-4-415 (West 2014) (“The
court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the
terms to the grantor’s intention if it is proved by preponderance of the evidence that both the grantor’s intent and the terms of the trust instrument
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Wisconsin
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 885.16 (West
2013). The dead man’s statute further applies to communications with an
agent of an adverse party, if the agent is deceased. See WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 885.17 (West 2013).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 908.03(3) (West
2014); id. (Judicial Council Comm. Note – 1974) (“Carved out of the abovementioned exclusion is the special situation of a testator’s declarations with
respect to execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant’s will.
The special circumstances of necessity and trustworthiness are discussed in
McCormick § 296. The admissibility of such declarations in cases involving
lost wills or genuineness of signature is acknowledged in Wisconsin. Will of
Oswald, 172 Wis. 345, 349, 178 N.W. 462, 464 (1920); Estate of Johnson, 170
Wis. 436, 453, 175 N.W. 917, 924 (1920); Gavitt v. Moulton, 119 Wis. 35, 50,
96 N.W. 395, 400 (1903); In re Valentine’s Will, 93 Wis. 45, 53, 67 N.W. 12,
14 (1896). However, in Estate of Melville, 234 Wis. 327, 331, 291 N.W. 382,
383 (1940), the doctrine may have been extended to revocation of a will.
Thus, this rule expands the application of the doctrine in Wisconsin but not
in a fashion that is inconsistent with the cited cases.”).
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Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See In re Bowler’s Trust, 201 N.W.2d 573, 579
(Wis. 1972) (“If the intent is clear no extrinsic evidence is necessary.”).
Note that WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.0415 (West 2014) abolishes the plain
meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.0415 (West 2014)
(“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s intent if it is proved by clear and convincing
evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust were
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).
Wyoming
Dead Man’s Statute: Recognized with Limitation. See WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-12-102 (West 2013) (permitting testimony from an interested witness,
yet requiring such testimony to be corroborated).
Hearsay Exception: Recognized. See WYO. R. EVID. 803(3).
Plain Meaning Rule (Wills): See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-105 (West 2013)
(“The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect
of his dispositions. The rules of construction expressed in the succeeding
sections of this article apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the
will.”). Note that WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-416 (West 2013) abolishes the
plain meaning rule for testamentary trusts. See id.
Plain Meaning Rule (Trusts): Extrinsic evidence permitted for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-416 (West
2013) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).

